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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper develops a broad, multi-faceted approach to the socio-economics of money. 
The aim is to elaborate models with which to describe and analyze money and money 
systems in modern societies.  No single theory is conceivable but a complex of 
interlinked theories can help us understand and explain many aspects of money: (1) 
money as a means to represent and communicate value; (2) money as technology 
(money, like other technologies such as keys, carpenter tools, automobiles, factories, 
and nuclear power stations, embodies in its design particular rules and collective 
representation(s) and is associated with a variety of techniques for using it); (3) 
monetary orders as socio-technical systems that are in part designed, administered and 
regulated (there are institutional arrangements or rule regimes -- in particular the 
monetary order and policy, property rights, and markets -- relating to access, control, 
use, and management of money and money processes); (4) multiple perspectives, 
meanings, and uses of money within diverse institutional domains and social settings, 
for instance, the universalizing qualities of money  as well as its particularization in 
concrete social and moral settings;  (5) contradictory uses and purposes of money in 
modern societies: among others, as a medium of exchange, as a standard or measure of 
value; as a basis for expanding productive capacity ("capital") or initiating projects and 
programs; as a source of social power.  
 Section I examines the meaning and normative regulation of money and 
money uses. Section II introduces and develops the idea of money- or exchange-value 
as distinct from substantive-, use-, or particularistic-values, and the transformation of 
one type of value into another through particular institutional arrangements and 
processes, e.g. markets. Section III analyzes the social construction of money through 
complex institutional processes and the establishment and maintenance of binding 
definitions of the social fact or reality of money. In Section IV we consider the 
regulation and stabilization of money systems -- as complex, changing systems that may 
fail or collapse, causing widespread economic, social, and political crises. Section V 
provides a summary of a number of key points and conclusions.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Money is a major, ubiquitous but elusive social construction. Many of its institutional 
and symbolic features are apparent. Less obvious perhaps is money's materiality. 
Money is a socially defined and accepted rule or rule system that defines and supports 
some object or material as a medium of exchange. To effectively accomplish this 
function, it has to fulfill certain material requirements of convenience, durability, and 
divisibility. Among the types of money are: (1) commodity "money" -- anything with 
intrinsic value which is generally acceptable for payment or exchange. Objects such as 
shells, cattle, salt, furs, coins of gold or silver, etc have functioned as money (see later). 
In a certain sense,  exchange with such valuables is close to "barter" and the concept 
and utilization of the valuable as money emerged through repeated interactions and 
organic processes (see below).1 (2) fiat money -- bits of paper, pieces of metal, or 
magnetic traces declared to be "money", that is, a medium of exchange, by some 
authority, the Prince, an official agency, a government or a specific type of bank. Such 
money may or may not be convertible to gold or other recognized and trusted currency. 
That is, in a certain sense all monies are social constructions, whether it be bank notes, 
accounting money, plastic and electronic monies, or metals. What distinguishes 
different types of money is the type of materiality, its particular creator and regulator, 
the bases of trust in it and its security. 
 As economists would emphasize, money not only serves as a generalized 
means of payment or exchange. It also often serves as a unit of account,2 thus enabling 
actors to assess and compare the exchange- or market-value of different goods, services, 
obligations, rights, or any entity that can be purchased or is marketable. It symbolizes, 
therefore, a type of value, relating to market- or exchange-value. Actors develop 
collective representations and cognitive frames and techniques that allow them to utilize 
money competently, to make assessments and decisions, and take actions, relating to 
money use and money flows. They also are bearers of and enact rule regimes for 
defining the meaning of the symbol and the rights and obligations (e.g., property rights 
and administrative orders) regulating access to its use, management and maintenance. 
Money is more than simply a basis for representing and communicating a certain type 
of value. Modern money is a rationalizing technology. It enables a high degree of 
standardization, systematization, and universalization (Simmel, 1978). It functions in a 
way that most economists understand, not only in the transactions between different 
economic agents but between different domains and segments of society. In this it plays 
an integrative role at the same time that it facilitates an elaborate division of labor and 
differentiation of society.  
 Monetary systems increasingly rely on different types of fiat money, some 
of which are very intangible forms for most of us -- appearing as magnetic traces in 
computer memories (the material basis for account keeping, as discussed below).3 
Monetary transactions take place by means of cheques, credit-cards, and by credit-
transfer, where one account is reduced (debited) and another increased (credited) by the 
same amount electronically. Traditional monies were commodity monies, consisting of 
objects such as shells or pieces of silver having an intrinsic value of their own. After 
having dematerialized money from its valuable commodity basis (gold, silver, etc.), 
modern systems are pushing this logic one step further by reducing  the dependence on 
physical notes and coins, that is "cash," hence the somewhat misleading concept of the 
"cashless society". The intrinsic value of most monies today is minimal or non-existent. 
This already points to the key basic issue of the existence and reproduction of money 
systems: social trust. Money also serves often (but not invariably) as a storage of value. 
In the case of a money with intrinsic value, the material  is expected to endure. The 
material of fiat money is also expected to be durable. Even the signs in bank balance 
books or magnetic traces in computer systems are required and expected to have a 
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substantial half-life. This is a material requisite and necessary condition for commodity 
money to serve as an effective storage of value. But money is obviously not simply 
material (whether gold, silver, paper, or markings in ledgers). It is a symbol of a type of 
value, an entity constructed and defined within a cultural-institutional framework, that 
is, particular cultural forms and institutional arrangements. To be a store of value in the 
case of token money requires social trust, an implicit social contract among the 
members of society that this token of money will be accepted in the future and 
everywhere as a means of payment. 
 Since money is an artifact, it is a special type of material technology 
(Burns and Flam, 1987; Burns and Dietz, 1992b),  It must consist of resistant materials 
This material(s) should be such that its production can exclusively be carried out by its 
creator and manager of the money system. On the other hand, the materials cannot be of 
a "sacred character". Holy objects cannot be made into a general money. Over a 
substantial period of the evolution of money, money materials in the case of commodity 
money had an "intrinsic" socially determined value (as in the case of gold, silver, or 
copper). Even purely fiat monies, such as banknotes, letters of credit, and paper money, 
were guaranteed by being exchangeable for valuables. 
 A monetary order may be created for particular -- and potentially 
contradictory -- purposes such as to provide a general medium of exchange, to store 
value, and, as a source of investment, to initiate projects and developments, etc. Actors 
may discover also that they can use the money for purposes not anticipated, or to use it 
in ways different from those planned by policymakers and managers of the money 
system. Typically, any technology may be put to uses never intended or imagined -- 
indeed, human agency often entails the transfer of a use from one domain or context to 
another, or in any given context to use the technology in new and previously 
unanticipated ways. 
 The money technology, like any other technology, entails in its use risks. 
It can be stolen or counterfeited. It can be debased or loose its value (even becoming 
worthless when a monetary order collapses). Money users and managers learn to define 
dangers and risks, developing strategies to deal with these. Central banks -- as well as 
the banks that are strategic in mediating money flows, managing deposits and 
safeguarding of money, mobilizing and loaning money -- develop models and regulative 
strategies as well as normative guidelines to assure a high level of security, for instance, 
protection against major dangers and risks. One major risk is that people come to 
distrust the banks and "run" on them, withdrawing deposits; or they lose confidence in 
the money and develop a preference for other currencies or more secure valuables (gold, 
precious stones, land), refusing to accept payment in the money. Indeed, the effective 
functioning of any monetary order, its banks, and  money exchange and flows depends 
on collective trust and on normative and social control processes that maintain and 
reinforce such trust, a conception we develop later.   
 Practical measures (i.e. prudential regulation) are institutionalized to 
establish or maintain security, to protect against, for example, the collapse of individual 
banks, the erosion of money value, counterfeiting, the loss of trust in the banking 
system. Measures taken by the policy makers and managers of a money system include 
"objective" ones, such as regulating the expansion and terms of credit, exercising 
checks and controls at all levels of banking and monetary performance. Because fiat 
money and money systems depend to a high degree on people's trust in the monetary 
system over time and space, confidence in its authorities and managers, and in the worth 
of money itself, the measures enacted to achieve this are not simply objective or real 
ones. There are often many symbolic measures: the performance of public rituals and 
the formulation of persuasive discourses to convey the message that the security of the 
money system, its banks, its managers, the currency itself is solid, a social fact -- 
everything is in proper and effective order! Thus, people may trust in -- and rely on 
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their actions and interactions upon -- the system and its currency. But, as we shall see, 
this may be no small task. 
 This paper introduces a number of concepts and develops models with 
which to describe and analyze money and money systems in modern societies. The aim 
is to develop a broad, multi-faceted approach to the socio-economics of money. No 
single theory is conceivable (cf. Dodd, 1994) but a complex of inter-relatable theories 
can help us understand and explain many aspects of money as well as money systems: 
(1) money as a means to represent and communicate value; (2) money as technology 
(money, like other technologies such as keys, carpenter tools, automobiles, factories, 
and nuclear power stations, embodies in its design particular rules and collective 
representation(s) and is associated with a variety of techniques for using it); (3) 
monetary orders as socio-technical systems that are in part designed, administered and 
regulated (There are institutional arrangements or rule regimes -- in particular a 
monetary order and policy, property rights, and markets -- relating to access, control, 
use, and management of money and money processes). (4) the multiple perspectives, 
meanings, and uses of money within different institutional domains and social settings, 
for instance, the universalizing qualities of money as well as its particularization aspects 
in concrete social domains and settings; (5) contradictory uses and purposes of money 
in modern societies: as a medium of exchange, as a standard or measure of value; as a 
basis for expanding productive capacity ("capital"), for instance, initiating projects and 
programs; as a source of social power, etc.  
 
Taking all those aspects together makes money a tri-faceted social institution: a 
symbolic asset, a socio-economic mean of exchange, and a cultural device. Partly along 
such lines, there are three approaches to the social institution of money. The first is an 
anthropological one, which has its roots in the work of Simmel (1978), but is best 
exemplified by Agliettea and Orléan (1982, 2002) and Codere (1968) and usefully 
complemented by historical and ethnology studies (Testart, 2002).4   The second 
approach is clearly the economic one, although it is far from unified (see, for instance, 
Clower (1969)). Quite the contrary, money in economic theory has been and still is the 
subject of heated controversies and has produced an enormous literature. There is quite 
a divergence: From the traditional neo-classical approach, the quantity theory of money 
rooted in the perfectly competitive general equilibrium tradition (see for example, 
Friedman (1956) but also in a different perspective Tobin (1969)) to the post-Keynesian 
approach to money as an endogenous variable (Davidson 1978), and from Keynes' 
Treatise of Money through Leijonhufvud’s (1968) non-walrasian interpretation of 
Keynes to the Lucas, Wallace and Sargent "classical macroeconomics" world.. The 
substantial conceptual and theoretical differences between these approaches suggests in 
our view that money resists the unidimensional, mono-disciplinary approach that 
economics tends to support, but has thus far failed to realize. The third approach, ours, 
tries to embed the economic and anthropological approaches into a more general socio-
economic systems framework. It does not pretend to be more comprehensive or more 
enlightened than the two other approaches. On the contrary, we firmly believe that these 
three approaches are complementary and that each of them implicitly or explicitly refers 
to the other two.  Each one sheds a different light on some of the key features of money 
as a societal phenomena related to the cohesion but also the fragility of modern 
societies. 
 
Much of the paper draws on earlier work (Andersen and Burns, 1992; Baumgartner et 
al, 1986; Burns et al, 1985; Burns and Carson, 2002; Burns and Dietz, 1992a, 1992b; 
Burns and Flam, 1987; Burns et al, 1987; DeVille and Burns, 1976) dealing with 
institutional and cultural phenomena,  and analyzing money and banking systems with 
in such a general framework. Section I examines the meaning and normative regulation 
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of money and money uses. Section II introduces and develops the idea of money- or 
exchange-value as distinct from substantive-, use-, or particularistic-values, and the 
transformation of one type of value into another through particular institutional 
arrangements and processes, e.g. markets. Section III analyzes the social construction of 
money through institutional alchemy and the establishment and maintenance of binding 
definitions of the reality or social fact. In Section IV we consider the regulation and 
stabilization of money systems -- as complex, changing systems that may fail or 
collapse, causing widespread economic, social, and political crises. Section V provides 
a summary of our several key points and conclusions.  
 
I. THE CONTEXTUALIZATION AND NORMATIVE REGULATION OF 
MONEY 
 
Economists typically stress the universal, non-contextualized and decontextualizing 
aspects of money -- and focus on economic behavior in relation to money based on  
"instrumental rationality” as the methodological foundation of their science. Sociology 
as well as other social sciences orients us -- makes us alert -- to the powerful forces of 
particularization that operate in spite of and often in opposition to money-
universalization. Of special interest in our perspective is the interplay between 
universalizing and particularizing processes in relation to money 
 While modern money may be a general purpose medium of exchange -- 
and in a certain sense "universal" -- human agents divide up the world differentiating 
distinct domains, each more or less with its particular purposes, norms, roles, and 
institutionalized values and relationships (Burns and Flam, 1987, Chapters 7 and 17). 
Each rule system constituting and regulating an institutional domain introduces 
distinctions, category systems, restrictions and controls -- a particular moral world -- 
that play a key role in the earmarking of money and money flows and the investment of 
particular designated monies in activities, projects and programs within each domain.  
Zelizer (1994:18-19:142) argues, somewhat overstating however this important point: 
"There is no single, uniform, generalized money; but multiple monies: people earmark 
different currencies for many or perhaps all types of interactions, much as they create 
distinctive languages for different social contexts. And people will in fact respond with 
anger, shock, or ridicule to the "misuse" of monies for the wrong circumstances such as 
offering a thousand-dollar bill to pay for a newspaper or tipping a restaurant's owner. 
Money used for rational instrumental exchanges is not "free" from social constraints... 
...Money has not become the free, neutral, and dangerous destroyer of social relations."  
 In sum, money has different societal meanings in different institutional 
domains or contexts. These meanings can be specified and explicated in term of the 
social rule systems constituting and regulating each institutional domain. This is an 
implication of the fundamental idea that modern social life is divided into different 
institutional domains constituted and regulated by different rule regimes each with its 
own values, norms, symbol systems, social relationships, etc., each a particular moral 
world (Burns and Flam, 1987).  
 From such a perspective, it is apparent why not everything is 
commodified, subject to potential exchange and as a consequence, leading to monetary 
transactions. It is not acceptable in most modern societies to purchase court decisions, 
government policies, legislation, etc. Of course, some agents refuse to abide by such 
norms and institutional arrangements, breaching the barriers and regulations and 
undermining social order. There are then risks and dangers of corruption and illegal 
commodification (in the operation of black markets, for example, of forbidden goods 
and services).  In this sense, values and rules of social life may define, structure, and 
constrain the uses and abuses of generalized money. People, organizations, and 
governments often restrict the liquidity of money, and create budgets or currency-
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equivalents for designated transactions and transaction domains. Gift certificates, food 
stamps, coupons, domestic monies, gift monies, are all examples of specially created 
and regulated monies. Only when reductionist, rational-instrumental thinking has been 
allowed to override richer social sensibilities are such transfers equivalent to payment-
in-exchange." 
 Zelizer (1994:24) drawing on Jean Lave's work, stresses that in families -- 
but it holds true for bureaucracies and other organizations as well (see later) -- members 
compartmentalize their funds into distinct accounts that reflect and support the social 
relationships and categories of activities into which people organize themselves." In this 
perspective, money is employed so as to enact and express as well as reproduce, social 
relationships, moral distinctions, and normative orders. Different institutional and 
organizational domains as well as networks of social relations -- each with its more or 
less particular system of rules and meanings --  introduce distinctions, restrictions, and 
control that mark the use of money assets, that particularize it.5 Later we shall examine 
some of the ways that particularization and regulation of money income is related to 
institutional arrangements that embody and organize values in a value nexus and also 
transform values into one another. 
 
. 
2. The Socio-politics of Money Particularization; The Maintenance of Boundaries 
and Social Structure 
 
Money and money processes entail micro- as well as macro-politics. This concerns not 
only the activation of particular norms and social relationships in connection with 
money processes  -- but also the defense of social orders that are threatened by the 
introduction of valuables such as money, or the commercialization of a domain. 
 Burns et al (1972) compared Melanesian communities that responded in 
substantially different ways to the influx of universalistic money (from Australia), 
where in one type of social order it could be exchanged for almost everything, including 
the traditional values on which the normative and social order was based, and in the 
other order such full convertibility was blocked. The evolution of the two types of 
societies was very different, as we argue below.  
 Shell monies are in widespread use in Melanesian societies. A "big man" 
is one who establishes and uses power over others to give him leverage on their 
production and the ability to siphon off excess products -- shell moneys as well as pigs, 
and vegetable foods (Burns et al, 1972; Sahlins, 1968). Big men employ money-like 
valuables, including shell money, as power tokens. Through particular strategies, the 
big men transforms turn economic imbalance into political inequality. This is most 
apparent in the case of the principal valuable: a type of shell money known as tabu. The 
valuable is limited in supply, storable, divisible into discrete interchangeable units, and, 
unlike many other Melanesian ceremonial valuables, is freely convertible into 
consumables (however in some cases, not into cash, see below). It is through the skilled 
use of tabu that political schemers achieve power and prestige. There is a variety of 
other valuables present, namely consumables like vegetables, fish, betel, and specialist 
skills in magic, dance, song composition, or carving, as well as capital equipment like 
canoes and such ceremonial goods as masks. It is difficult to acquire large stocks of 
tabu through providing such goods or services (Burns et al, 1972; Salisbury, 1966). 
 Big men gain prestige and power initially through the support of fellow 
clan members. Organizational ability and effort along with investments lead to 
increased personal wealth and the ability to mobilize and dispose of valuables worth 
several times what one owns oneself. This in turn leads to increased support, both in the 
intensity of loyalty and in the number of supporters. Furthermore, the big man seeks to 
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widen the base of support by increasing the number of domains over which he has 
control, e.g. song compositions, dances, capital equipment, etc. 
 In most Melanesian societies -- and this is a key point here -- shell money 
as well as other major valuables were not freely convertible either for other such 
valuables or for other goods and services. The classic cases in the literature (The 
Trobriands and Rossel Island) are of this type. Big men controlling shell money could 
build and maintain their power in part through sponsoring feasts and spectaculars, and 
also through a system of extensive loans, often though not exclusively to young men for 
bride payments. In such societies women were important valuables. Men aspiring to 
big-man status often acquired more wives than the average. This allowed them to 
increase vegetable and pig production for feasting. Among the Langalanga of the 
southeastern Solomons, it allowed for more extensive household division of labour, 
freeing some wives to work almost full-time on shell-money production. The general 
point here is that those who controlled the highest ranked valuables, here shell-money, 
also controlled access to other valuables and thus were able to extend and elaborate 
their social power in the society. But these accumulation processes were obviously 
constrained and regulated, above all in terms of limitations on convertibility. 
 The greater the number and strength of normative and social constraints 
(as a result of, for example, strong lineage systems) on a leader's or an aspiring leader's 
discretion and opportunities, the less his ability to extend his control over a range of 
valuables and to enhance his social power. Level of resource control and power makes a 
difference, however. Really big men -- who maintain their positions of power for long 
periods of time and have many supporters and access to and control over substantial 
material sources --  gain opportunities (and also motives) for circumvention of key 
norms. Under conditions of free competition, the established big men are able to outbid 
weaker ones for control over surplus valuables, leaving the weaker fewer as well as 
inferior qualities of valuables with which to seek to advance their positions. In this way, 
the powerful continue to accumulate followers, wealth, and resources, thus enhancing 
their position at the expense of weaker agents. Shell money, as suggested above, is a 
key factor in this.  
 The accumulation process is limited, however, by internal and external 
constraints: internally, by the unavailability of additional resources; externally, by the 
spheres of influence of other big men.6 Finally, the big man's position is not an office 
with established authority rights, although it rests on well-established property rights 
regimes. Rather, it depends on a network of personalistic ties and is vulnerable to breaks 
in these ties or in economic transformations (see below). Death is also an obvious 
factor. A legitimating ideology of office holding of chieftainship or kingship would 
serve to constrain followers' freedom of action. 
 Although there are norms and constraints on convertibility between shell 
monies and other Western valuables, the introduction of Western or foreign currency (as 
well as other valuables) opens up new political opportunities and strategies -- which 
threatens established big man arrangements. The outcome of all of this depends largely 
on not only power but also normative factors, although cognitive factors also play an 
important role.  
 In those societies where big men tightly control the supply of scarce and 
highly valued goods, e.g. shell money and women, and restrict the penetration of cash, 
or maintain very high artificial rates of exchange, the traditional social structure is 
maintained and reproduced to a great extent. For example, the Tolai, one of the most 
advanced peoples, maintain their focal interest in tabu (Salisbury, 1970). They deal in 
cash every day, but refuse to exchange tabu for money. And yet tabu is used for 
everyday exchanges as well as for ceremonial payments. In other words, we find two 
forms of money, one of which cannot be exchanged for the other, but both are 
convertible into a number of consumables. Young men returning from employment 
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abroad or from nearby Western firms or government agencies would like to purchase 
tabu but are prevented from doing so. They can obtain it only through the traditional 
system of distribution and patronage of big men. In this way, the latter effectively 
maintain their power -- and reproduce many elements of the traditional social order -- 
by keeping the system of shell money accumulation and distribution intact while 
simultaneously accumulating cash and Western goods. 
 If controllers of new valuables such as Western money do not face such 
constraints, these valuables may sweep the field. Such a situation seems to have 
occurred in the New Guinea Highlands in the 1950's and later. Local business leaders in 
the area developed in the style of traditional big men. But these new leaders substituted 
cash for shells and engaged in modern business activity: coffee plantations, trade stores, 
truck ownership, etc rather than in the traditional production, exchange, and re-
distribution activities of the big men. Their economic as well as "political" success 
typically depended on the partial support of kinsmen for labour and the pooling of 
capital. As organizers of visibly successful activities and manipulators of men, they 
gained prestige and further support. Followers supported these business leaders because 
they hoped to share in the prestige, gain valuable services, and obtain part of the profits. 
Moreover, the business leader's success was readily transferable into political power in 
the Australian-administered system at that time. 
 In Melanesian societies the interface -- and possibly shifting boundary -- 
between shell money and Western money entails a type of politics. In some cases there 
is contestation over boundaries of normative orders: more precisely, there is the 
question of the convertibility of Western money into traditional shell money. Key 
groups may try to limit the penetration of Western money into the social order; in other 
cases no substantial effort is made to stop penetration, or the efforts at restriction fail. 
Two distinct patterns of socio-economic development emerged in Melanesian societies 
(Burns et al, 1972): 
 
- When non-convertibility is enforced, the traditional big-man nexus and social 
structure are maintained and reproduced to a large extent. 
- With convertibility of Western money into shell money, the traditional order is 
eroded and eventually restructured, replaced by a type of money nexus and 
social structure based on differential control over or access to Western money. 
 
In this respect, Braudel (1979:437) pointed out, "For the same process can be observed 
everywhere: any society based on an ancient structure which opens its doors to money 
sooner or later loses its acquired equilibria and liberates forces that can never afterwards 
be adequately controlled. The new form of interchange disturbs the old order, benefits a 
few privileged individuals and hurts everyone else. Every society has to turn over a new 
leaf under the impact." 
 In sum, the process of introducing "external or foreign monies" into 
Melanesian systems of power and authority point up the interplay of power factors, on 
the one hand, and normative regulation and constraint, on the other. New money flows 
open up opportunities for peripheral actors to improve their position and to challenge 
those whose power and authority is based on earlier resource conditions and flows. The 
money flows, the constraints and opportunities, the exercise of agency take place within 
a particular normative-institutional order. Powerful actors also may try to develop 
counter strategies to correct imbalances resulting from the introduction of "external and 
foreign monies". One of these strategies has been to restrict the penetration of foreign or 
new monies -- for example by not allowing the exchange of money for tabu.7 
 
The question of particularizing versus universalizing processes with respect to money 
is, in part, a matter of politics and struggle. Historically, one can observe that 
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commodification -- the extension of the money-nexus -- clashes with the logic of 
maintaining particular traditional relationships and the moral order in a group, 
organization, or institutional domain. Zelizer (1994) in her important work draws our 
attention to the success stories, the cases where agents in a social institution such as the 
family effectively resist commodification, and maintain a substantive- or use-value 
nexus and social structure based on values commitments and related practices (Burns et 
al, 1985). But there are failures as well, cases where the money-nexus and 
commodification undermines social orders or transforms them into quite different 
orders, as the discussion here has suggested. For instance, the more that money becomes 
a "general equivalent,” the exclusive expression of wealth and income in society, the 
more "instrumental rationality" and the increasing unidimensiolality of social exchange 
may be reinforced. 
 
II. VALUE NEXUS AND VALUE TRANSFORMATION: 
PARTICULARIZATION AND UNIVERSALIZATION PROCESSES 
 
The use of money as a "general equivalent" in transactions is a social fact, socially 
produced. The belief in the worth of a "monetary unit" is not determined only by a 
monetary authority or government, but, as we discuss later, is validated and reinforced 
through the beliefs and actions, judgments and discourses of a community of money 
users, or potential money users. 
 Because money is a general value or valuable that can be used to exchange 
with and to realize many other values, possession of money has a generalized 
empowering capacity over time and space (Dodd, 1994).  Money provides, for instance, 
market purchasing power. It is also a basis for acquiring or obtaining prestige and 
status, as discussed in the preceding section. The value of money can be differentiated 
from substantive values -- particularistic values, use-values, moral values, etc -- which 
are grounded in concrete human needs, in collectively valued objects and artifacts, 
actions, and ideas. Some of these are commodified and have a price on a market. Other 
socially defined entities are explicitly de-commodified and denied access to markets: 
for example, laws, government policies, court decisions, body parts, sexual services, 
sperm, many drugs, and medical techniques as well as particular public services. If they 
are distributed at all, it is through non-market mechanisms (Burns and Flam, 1987).  
 Money, as a generalized medium of exchange, allows for the exchange, 
transfer, distribution, and redistribution of money value among different social worlds -- 
with different institutional arrangements, substantive values, and functions, e.g. the 
worlds of family, community, religious association, state agency, business enterprise, 
and numerous voluntary or non-government organizations. Markets, in particular, are 
institutional arrangements where the universal features of money are emphasized, and 
given their free play.  Yet, buyers in markets typically participate as representatives or 
members of particular organizations which set off "earmarked monies" and, therefore, 
set limits on what transactions the representatives, as particular "buyers", may enter 
into, what they may purchase, how much money can be used, when purchases may, 
should, must be carried out, etc.  
 As suggested earlier, the particular systems of rules in each institutional 
domain provide, among other things, a basis to categorize and evaluate activities, and 
also to make meaningful budget distinctions in indexing money in the specific budgets 
or special monies associated with programs, projects, plans, and activities within the 
institutional domain. In all of this, the money allocation and earmarking processes give 
expression to and also contribute to realizing and reproducing valued patterns of 
interaction, social relationships and institutional arrangements, whether family, 
religious community, bureaucracy, government agency or enterprise. One key to 
understanding the logic of any given institutional domain are the particular value 
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transformations that are organized and carried out in the domain.8 The following 
sections examine three major types of value transformation. 
 
1. Particularization Transform (I).  
The universal exchange-value of money value M is transformed into concrete activities, 
programs, and projects that embody or express institutionalized use- or substantive-
values -- within the institutional context, whether family, government welfare agency, 
religious organization, or business enterprise. Symbolically: M [Money or exchange 
value] ---> TI [Social Organization: categorization, allocation and realization processes] 
---> Vi [Use-value embodied in particular institutionalized activities, projects, and 
programs].  Through allocation to or investment in particular budgets or accounts, a 
uniform, coherent value of money is transformed into institutionally particular 
substantive- or use-values.   
 In a family, for instance, some accounts or budgets relate to everyday 
living expenses and would be distinct from pension funds, an education account for the 
children, purchase of a summer cottage, acquisition of art, etc. (Zelizer, 1994). 
Similarly, in a bureaucratic agency, particular, possibly legally binding, distinctions are 
made between operating expenses and an investment fund for a new facility or new 
equipment. In other words, the operating expenses are earmarked according to the 
institutionalized programs, projects, and activities of the bureaucratic agency and are 
intended to realize particular laws, policies, etc, that are expressions of the 
institutionalized values and goals of the organization.  
 Generally speaking, money assets in an overall or total budget are 
allocated or divided up into budgets or accounts associated with particular activities, 
programs, projects, and plans in any given relational or institutional context.9 The 
universal exchange value of monies is transformed by the indexing or earmarking of 
money assets into particularized monies or budgets associated with substantive-values, 
with social and even sacred markers. Even more dramatic transformation is the 
purification or "laundering" of profane money into sacred budgets, applications and 
uses (Zelizer, 1994:22). The general pattern is one where Type I value transformations 
are organized and operated in ways that reflect and realize the normative order of the 
institution, whether the institution is a family, religious association, government agency, 
or business enterprise. Any such realization processes entail "investing value(s)" 
through concrete efforts and programs. Realization is not unproblematic: essential 
transformations may fail to be carried out effectively, or they may be carried out in 
distorted and self-defeating ways.  
 
2. Commodification Transform (II).  
Here particular valuables -- land, consumer goods, tools and technology, services or 
labor -- which have substantive- or use-values are transformed into money assets 
through market processes. 10 For example, employees or workers exchange their labor or 
labor potential for money income. The income gained is the basis for them to realize 
particular values and projects within families, communities, networks, and other 
associations. Market processes transforming use-valuables into exchange values can be 
symbolically represented as follows:  Vi [Particular substantive- or use-values embodied 
in labor, techniques, tools, land, etc.] ---> TII [market processes] ---> M [money or 
exchange-value]. The money income gained can then be used by individuals, groups, 
organizations, institutional domains, to purchase meaningful goods and services for 
themselves, thus again transforming exchange-value into use-value as one mode of 
particularization (Transform I). One of the basic functions and achievements of markets 
is to enable or facilitate multiple value transformations. 
 Money based transactions enable the exchange and transformation of 
different values into one another, across markets, domains and segments of modern 
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society. This points up the generalized empowering capacity of money -- its value as a 
power resource. These multiple transformations are a basic integrating mechanism in a 
complex, modern society (cf. Dodd, 1994), precisely because money facilitates linkages 
between different value domains, activities, and groups in a differentiated society (see 
later).   
 
3. Capital Multiplier Transform (III) 
Money assets M are translated into concrete enterprises, programs, and projects (that 
may entail intrinsic values), which in turn are intended to result in money gains 
(profits). Symbolically: M ---> TIII [Organization and operation of "production" and 
exchange processes] ---> M+. This represents the basic logic of a capitalist enterprise, 
where the driving value underlying the transformation is precisely "making money" or 
realizing profit. Of course, the products, activities, programs may have intrinsic value to 
many of those employed in the enterprise at the same time that the money-making or 
money-transforming processes per se may be only of marginal interest to them (or even 
largely outside of their awareness). 
  The capitalist enterprise -- typically in ways more rational and systematic 
than a family, government agency, or voluntary organization -- takes a budget of 
generalized money and translates or transforms it into particular indexed monies 
(budgets or accounts) in order to ultimately realize particular money-making plans, 
projects, programs, and strategies. The use-values of enterprise projects and programs 
are means, not ends. The value transformation- and realization-logic of the business 
enterprise is obviously different from that of non-business organizations (there are 
interesting hybrid organizations that combine both, such as family firms and money-
oriented religious organizations).11  
 In sum, the conceptual analysis outlined here identifies several key value 
transformations of, for instance, exchange-values into substantive- or use-value budgets, 
and ultimately into particular activities and projects that realize institutionalized values. 
Each institution -- enacted in defined areas of activity -- gives expression to and 
organizes the realization and transformation of specific values. These together with their 
expression in programs, projects, and activities give the institution its identity and 
underlie the logic of its value transformations and value realizations.  
  
III. INSTITUTIONAL ALCHEMY: SOCIETAL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
PROCESSES IN THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MONEY 
 
In the creation of fiat money, an authority, central bank or government office defines or 
designates some material "X" as money with a particular face-value or worth $. 
Worthless pieces of paper are transformed into valuable money assets through such an 
institutional alchemy. But the initial designation process, the definition of fiat money, is 
only the beginning of a complex societal process, the construction of the social and 
institutional facts of money (Searle, 1995). What is critical are the social controls and 
self-fulfilling processes that make a definition or designation binding and stabilize it. 
 Various legal and other social controls contribute to structuring and 
regulating social interactions so as to reinforce acceptance and adherence to the 
definition, that is, to make or maintain a binding definition of the situation. A modern 
state's police and judicial powers strengthens its ability to impose fiat money -- for 
instance, by requiring people to accept it as payment in exchange transactions. Equally 
important is the establishment and reinforcement of a collective trust or belief in the 
money's worth and collective confidence in the system creating and regulating money, 
as we discuss later.  
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1. The Institutional Perspective on the Social Construction of Money 
 
Assume an object or material X has intrinsic value in a community, for example, shells, 
cattle, or particular metals. The participants in the community recognize X as valuable, 
and use -- or may use -- X as a medium of exchange, that is as ”money”. X also can 
function as a storage of value, or as a means of mobilizing resources for particular 
projects, initiatives, investments, and developments. 
 In order to function as money, "X" need have no intrinsic value. It may 
consist of pieces of paper or more or less worthless metals; particular marks in a ledger 
or on a magnetic tape or in the memory of a computer. An authority A makes the 
determination that X is to function as money M with unit value $. Such "fiat money" is 
typical of modern monies. Agents assess and react to these pronouncements. Emergent 
reactions -- organic, spontaneous, etc -- make for a type of validation (or invalidation, 
as the case may be). Their behavior adheres to, "conforms" with, or deviates from the 
definitions and determinations of the authority A. X functions as money in fact insofar 
as people in a population believe in -- and act according to -- this institutional 
determination. Such belief and practice rest in part on a stable definition or conception 
of reality, namely that A has the authority and power to back up and maintain the 
institutional fact that "X" is M having a unit value of $. This depends on types of "self-
fulfilling processes" (see later). It also depends to a considerable degree on the exercise 
of power and authority. In particular, the authority A has the capacity -- or appears to 
have the capacity -- to mobilize the resources, material or symbolic, to "back up" M. 
This may mean a readiness to exchange for M more basic or trustworthy valuables such 
as gold, silver, or physical property; or another currency in which most people trust. 
But, even in the absence of such convertibility, people are inclined to believe the social 
fact because others believe it and act on this belief (convergent mimetic behavior) – at 
least, as long as there is no apparent reason to doubt it (the factor of "habit" also plays a 
role (Dodd, 1995)). A typical social control mechanism for sustaining such mimetic 
behavior involves experts making pronouncements that are intended to persuade people 
that no risk is involved in holding the money assets.  Faith, trust, and shared belief are 
essential cornerstones of money systems. Later we shall examine how collective belief 
and trust are vulnerable in particular ways to erosion or collapse, so that money and 
banking systems fail. We also examine ways in which institutionalized strategies and 
arrangements may operate to maintain trust in a monetary order (discussed more fully in 
Section IV). 
 The social acceptance of money entails multiple processes of "validation" 
and maintenance of conditions or trust or belief so that a particular social definition 
holds. In general, a key to the construction of an institutional fact like money -- the 
making of stable, binding definitions of the situation -- are multiple social control and 
power processes (cf. Searle, 1995). Of course, an authority's ability to get people to 
accept fiat money is strengthened by the policies and judicial powers of a modern state. 
Black markets may arise, of course, as enterprises and individuals avoid the use of the 
currency (contrary to legal requirements) or illegally exchange the domestic currency 
for other, more trustworthy currencies. Such actions contribute to or validate a 
collective belief that the money is of uncertain or risky value. This loss of confidence or 
trust in the currency further motivates people to avoid it and to trade and store value in 
other specie or liquid valuables. Moreover, a growing refusal to accept the domestic 
currency means that the state loses some of its clout in extracting segniorage -- in 
particular printing money that can be used to finance its operations; quite simply, 
enterprises and individuals may refuse to accept it, or bargain to avoid taking it. 
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 In sum, the social construction of money depends on and is a 
manifestation of an underlying social structure and related normative and control 
processes. In the following discussion and also Section IV, we specify and discuss some 
of the ways in which institutional arrangements and organic societal processes operate 
to establish and maintain a binding definition of reality -- or, alternatively, how when 
that which has been intended as a binding definition of reality, particular institutional 
facts, are disrupted, eroded, unraveled there is a breakdown of the order (Burns and 
Dietz, 1997). 
  
2. Validation of Value Through Market and Market-Like  Processes 
 
In the case of most modern monies ("fiat money"), the "status of money" is determined 
through two distinct interrelated processes:12 
 
- authoritative/administrative process, that is an authority designates or decides on a 
value (e.g. exchange rate).  
 
-organic societal process, where populations of agents "vote" with their actions, 
manifesting their confidence or lack of confidence -- in the value of a currency and in 
the monetary order as a whole. 
 
 Both of these processes operate and interact in the construction of modern 
money systems and in the functioning of monetary orders. They operate often in 
contradictory ways, in that the institutional authority tries to legislate X as money with 
face-value $. But economic agents reject this, or they react contrarily -- denying this 
definition in their judgments, communications and actions, for instance refusing to use 
or hold the "money". The key to a robust money system is the complex of social 
mechanisms whereby collective beliefs and trust are generated and maintained. 
 An organic process of assessment and judgment of the worth of money 
occurs through actual transactions where monies are exchanged (one currency for 
another, or money for specie). Particular institutional arrangements organize and 
coordinate negotiations and exchanges in markets. Through such organized processes, 
"prices" and price variation (as well as volume of trade) are generated.13 Such an 
approach to markets -- more precisely the conceptualization of the social organization 
and interaction processes of markets -- takes as a basic methodological principle that the 
beliefs of agents and the market organizing principles and rules (the particular 
institutional arrangements) must be taken into account in order to understand the 
generation and dynamics of money processes and monetary orders. The liquidity or 
money preferences underlying the "supply and demand" of money are not exogenous, 
but are generated within the political economic system, for instance, through processes 
of trust-formation or trust-degeneration, a matter to which we turn in later sections.14 
Belief or trust in a monetary order is indeed vulnerable -- it must be structured and 
regulated in particular ways if people are to sustain trust in it and it is to function 
effectively. 
  
 
 
 
3. Public Trust as a Constitutive Factor in Stable, Robust Money and Banking 
Systems  
 
Particular "social facts" -- institutionalized or binding definitions of reality -- are for our 
purposes here such things as: the banking system as robust and dependable; any given 
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bank as trustworthy and reliable; the existence of a robust security net in case of a bank 
crash, or banking system failure; bank regulation as systematic, comprehensive, and 
effective; "real money" as pieces of papers or memory traces in a computer. The 
institutionalization of particular definitions of reality -- which together with a rule 
regime or normative order -- is the basis on which actors in a given domain collectively 
constitute and regulate their activities. Through their actions and interactions, they 
generate particular patterns (practices) and developments. Participants' beliefs, 
orientations, framings, and strategies play a major role in the functioning of institutions 
such as monetary orders. In short, their beliefs and values as well as interpretations 
make a difference in the functioning of the money system.15 
 A binding or institutionalized definition of the situation, like a norm, 
operates as a social fact to which actors orient and take into account in framing the 
situation, making judgments, and acting and interacting. It depends on the complicity of 
actors participating in -- or potentially prepared to participate in -- money processes. If 
they reject the definition, or simply become distrustful or skeptical, this will lead to 
changes in their orientations, judgments, and strategies such that the social fact is 
threatened or undermined  -- possibly setting the stage for a new reality with new social 
facts. The basis for institutionalized or binding definitions of reality is usually not solid 
evidence or intimate knowledge or information about the "mysteries" of a money order, 
the banking system's functioning, its regulation, or the behavior of the banks. These 
remain in large part obscure, if not mysterious for most people (Braudel, 1979:436). In 
general, it is beyond most people's capabilities to know or to obtain sufficient 
information about these systems or their components. Rather, they act on the basis of 
trust or shared confidence in the order, or its components, for example:16 (i) Trust in the 
monetary signs themselves (the printing on currency or the magnetic states in electronic 
systems will not fade away or suddenly disappear): (ii) Trust in the monetary order and 
its key agents (iii) Trust in one bank or in another. (iv) Trust of the general public or 
bank customers in any given bank.  
 Such belief is typically not supported by evidence actually known by the 
believers (however, trust in the sense that we use it here can be distinguished from 
unquestioning faith or acceptance). 17  Trust implies then a belief in the reliability -- and 
predictability -- of the institution's or order's functioning and performance. Such trust is 
a major constitutive component of social order, and, therefore partly self-validating. The 
role of collective belief in stabilizing or destabilizing social order -- in particular banks 
and banking systems, was pointed out by Merton (1957;1968) in his article on self-
fulfilling prophesies. The shared belief among bank depositors in the liquidity of the 
bank -- and the security of their deposits, or in the stability of the currency -- were 
strategic factors contributing to a particular order entailing social facts such as deposits, 
bank liquidity, stable currency, etc. The beliefs contribute, through their framing of and 
influence on action, to the validation of the beliefs. Thus, public trust in the stability of 
a currency -- in its value and its liquidity for making payments -- contributes to 
sustaining the overall system.  
 In his analysis of the phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy, Merton 
(1936, 1968) assumed that statements about future social situations are simply 'true' or 
'false', independent of the beliefs that actors hold (Krishna, 1971).18 However, the 
statements -- or beliefs on which they are based -- may or may not correspond to 
conditions or developments in social reality. Merton writes (1968:421): "The 
self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning a false definition of the situation evoking a 
new behavior which makes the originally false definition come true."  
 Merton refers to the bankruptcy of a major US bank in 1932 (many banks 
were forced to close their doors in this period). This closure was precipitated by rumors 
that the bank was in the process of going bankrupt. Depositors rushed to remove their 
money before the bank collapsed. As a result of their run on the bank, it indeed failed.19 
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Customer "deposits" became worthless or of highly uncertain value. According to 
Merton (1968:422): "The stable financial structure of the bank had depended upon one 
set of definitions of the situation: belief in the validity of the interlocking system of 
economic promises men live by. Once depositors had defined the situation otherwise, 
once they questioned the possibility of having these promises fulfilled, the 
consequences of this unreal definition were real enough." 
 The shared belief among depositors in the liquidity of the bank -- its 
capacity to pay depositors their claims and to assure the security of their deposits -- is a 
strategic, constitutive factor in generating or constructing the social fact of the effective 
liquidity of the bank.20 In other words, the liquidity is validated in part by the belief 
itself! The belief enters into actions, judgments and conditions, and influences 
potentialities, events, and developments in the situation, above all the viability of the 
bank, since a bank by lending out money is typically in a state where it is incapable of 
collecting all of its loans and returning on short notice all of the deposits to its clients. 
One cannot, therefore, speak of 'true' or 'false' or 'real' or 'unreal', at least in the sense of 
statements made independent of the situation referred to, when these statements (and 
the underlying beliefs) enter into actions and interaction and maintain or undermine a 
social definition of the situation. One should refer instead to potentialities, possibilities, 
or opportunities, which agents may exploit.  
 The contrary belief -- that the bank could not meet its obligations -- was of 
course a threat to the liquidity of the bank and, thus, a threat to its capacity to pay 
depositors on demand, particularly in the case where substantial numbers of depositors 
or potential depositors -- came to hold this belief. When such a belief spread to a 
substantial number of people who acted on the belief, the liquidity of the bank was, 
indeed, undermined. The rumor -- and the spreading belief -- that the bank might fail to 
meet the claims of its depositors were not invalid, contrary to Merton's argument. 
Certainly such a belief was potentially valid where there are real possibilities for the 
bank failing to meet its obligations. Under circumstances of widespread diffusion 
among bank depositors of the belief about pending bank illiquidity, the belief was and 
became, indeed, a valid one. This conception of a self-fulfilling or self-defeating 
prophecy differs substantially from that of Merton. 
 A shared belief or public trust in the liquidity of a bank -- in its capability 
to pay all its depositors their claims on demand -- contributes to sustaining a bank, even 
a bank having serious liquidity problems. The public trust is a major constitutive 
component of the socially defined and organized order. The bank is viable as long as the 
shared belief -- public trust -- is maintained and other events and circumstances do not 
undermine such trust in the bank's status. An undermining factor would be that other 
banks, or the Central Bank, refuse -- or possibly only hesitate -- to express trust or to 
show confidence toward the bank. Or they fail to take stabilizing measures vis-à-vis the 
bank. The importance of credible expectations about the behavior of the lender of last 
resort, the Central Bank, is crucial. 
 Obviously, public trust is not sufficient to assure liquidity. Other factors, 
such as the claims of other banks, the need to satisfy the regulations and controls of the 
central bank, the size of the bank’s reserves, its ratio of outstanding loan/reserves and so 
forth play a role in establishing or undermining the social fact (for instance, the 
reputation) of the viability of the bank. 
 Solid collective trust in the bank's viability might not, however, be 
absolutely valid in the institutional and socio- economic context at that time, for any 
such belief might have failed to recognize or to take into account the potential 
vulnerability of the bank or the volatility of the situation. In particular, it might not take 
into account the importance of the shared but vulnerable belief among depositors in the 
bank's viability and, indeed, the potential instability of the belief itself. 
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 Thus, contrary to Merton, a rumor -- and spreading belief -- among 
depositors that the bank might not meet its obligations is not invalid per se.21 Indeed, 
belief in a bank's liquidity would be vulnerable to invalidation under precisely those 
conditions which facilitate or reinforce the spread of the ”contrary belief” of weak 
liquidity and 'bank panic', in a word distrust. A potentially more ”realistic” belief would 
take into account the inherent vulnerability of the bank's situation and the clear and 
present danger of illiquidity developing, as a function of growing loss of confidence or 
distrust in the bank, or in the banking system as a whole. While our discussion here has 
focused on depositors, it applies as well to creditors or potential creditors.  The bank's 
liquidity image or reputation on the financial markets is critical for its continued access 
to capital markets. A depository institution awash with liquidity typically has little 
difficulty raising even more liquidity. But potential creditors are more likely to avoid 
depositing in a weak or vulnerable bank; or they demand higher than average interest 
rates from a bank experiencing liquidity problems (indeed, this may set the stage for a 
vicious circle of vulnerability -- declining trust -- greater vulnerability, increased 
liquidity problems, possibly ending in collapse). 
 Consider, for example, what a shift from a banking system in which all or 
most trust or believe in the liquidity of the system and the security of their accounts, to a 
system where serious distrust of liquidity emerges. If account-holders act on their 
doubts, "running" on their banks, they precipitate a banking crisis. The system is 
transformed from one structure of beliefs and patterned interaction -- on which trust has 
been based -- to another structure -- which is both the result of a loss of trust but also 
evidence or verification of significant distrust. In such a process, statements about 
future reality contribute to or set in motion certain strategic actions, thereby 
transforming the state of the system. Thus, prophesies about bank illiquidity may 
precipitate the crisis, and are potentially self-fulfilling. Such re-construction implies a 
major reorientation of organizing principles, rules, strategies, and system-knowledge for 
key groups of actors involved: owners of capital, enterprise managements, other banks, 
government agencies, and labor unions, among others. New frameworks for description, 
judgment, and action come to be established.22 
 In section IV, we consider a variety of institutional arrangements, 
mechanisms, and agents that operate to produce, maintain, and reinforce trust in the 
proper and effective functioning or performance of the money order, its agents, and its 
money technology; also of interest are strategies utilized to deal with or to minimize 
movements of distrust or destabilization of the order, or any of its key components. This 
is the basis for the establishment and stabilization of institutionalized definitions of 
reality -- social facts -- relating to monetary orders, or, indeed, any social order. 
  
IV. THE SOCIO-ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND MONEY SYSTEMS: 
BANKING SYSTEM FAILURE 
 
This section examines problems in establishing and maintaining monetary order. The 
focus is on historical innovations and failures, the concrete structuring and regulation of 
money and money systems (Baumgartner et al, 1996; Burns et al, 1985; DeVille and 
Burns, 1976). Nation states work to establish single national currencies (the case of the 
USA is examined below). While a private banking network may administer and enjoy 
enough clout to maintain a relatively stable and effective monetary order, typically there 
has been a shift from private initiative to public responsibility -- the establishment of a 
state-territory-money nexus. Moreover, there has been -- and continues to be -- an 
evolution of the institutional strategies and means to operate money systems (for a 
general treatment of evolutionary processes with human agency, see Burns and Dietz 
(1992a)). Changes in the system itself -- and the problems this generates -- are the focus 
in an examination of the evolution of the US banking system (see below). A basic 
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principle here is that what worked earlier, more or less effectively, tends to fail over 
time, in part because of unanticipated consequences of the regulative processes 
themselves and in part because of changes in and development of monetary systems.  
 
1. Banking and Money Regimes in a Historical Perspective: Money, Social Power, 
and Social Structure (DeVille and Burns, 1976; also see Burns, DeVille, and Flam, 
1987)  
 
In earlier work we addressed the development of money and money institutions that 
constitute and regulate key monetary processes and problems. Examples of such 
developments are the creation of central banks and monetary policies, fiscal policies, 
labor legislation, and regulatory agencies. DeVille and Burns (1976) viewed capitalist 
crises and regulatory responses as multi-dimensional and multiple level social 
phenomena, entailing contradictory socio-economic and political processes.  A key 
contradictory feature of the role of money in capitalism is that, on the one hand, it is 
used as a medium of exchange and, on the other hand, being an asset, it is used as a 
source of funds for investment, for capital expansion, and for accumulation, but it also 
allows for speculation. These uses or functions are not "naturally consistent" and 
systems of monetary regulation do not then operate unproblematically. Quite the 
contrary, our analyses suggest the profound problems of regulating complex money 
systems. As the case of any institution, multiple, often contradictory demands are made 
on such systems. 
  Money as a medium of exchange is an element present within any 
commodity-production system. It is the common "language", the "socially accepted 
signs" that make such exchange possible. But, as the structure of the exchange system 
becomes more complex, with the emergence of intermediaries (e.g. trade merchants), a 
differentiation is created between the sphere of production and the sphere of exchange. 
The emergence of "merchant capital" is the economic manifestation of functional (as 
well as power) relationships existing between producers and intermediaries. Actors 
come to discover or recognize another characteristic of money, namely its storage of 
value (and of social power). Money holdings become assets.  Merchants can use their 
accumulated monetary wealth and power not only to launch new money-making 
projects but to restructure exchange and market relationships -- and possibly even 
relationships of political power that can be exploited, in turn, to restructure money and 
other socio-economic institutional arrangements (Burns et al, 1985; Burns, 1995). 
 The contradictory nature of the role of money in the capitalist system (cf. 
Marx, 1973:203-207) is a major source of instability and the erosion of monetary 
systems. In order to adequately perform its function as a medium of exchange, monetary 
signs have to be based on a social consensus about its stability as a measure of value (as 
discussed in section III). But such stability is constantly threatened by the use of 
monetary signs for speculative purposes since they can also be used as source funds for 
capitalist investment, development, and further accumulation. This persistent (and 
enduring) contradiction between the uses or functions of money is pointed up again and 
again in the historical analysis of the evolution of the banking system and the related 
crises in the USA (DeVille and Burns, 1976; Friedman and Schwartz, 1963:240). 
 Before 1860, apart from a few attempts at regulation which never endured, 
the US banking system and the money market could be described as completely 
unregulated. A national currency did not actually exist. This resulted in a highly 
complicated system of clearing houses dealing with almost 10,000 different currencies 
which were for the essentially private bank notes! With increased industrialization and 
the ever-growing interstate commerce, such a situation could not persist. This was not 
only because it was cumbersome but also because it was highly unstable’. Indeed, the 
value of all the private bank notes depended on the estimated probability of converting 
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the notes into a given amount of specie (gold or silver). Such probability was itself 
obviously a function of the amount of reserves in specie that each bank was holding. 
But in the absence of any restrictions on credit expansion, banks (especially small 
county banks, the "wildcats") over- committed themselves in lending money. Defaults 
were frequent, resulting in recurrent panics and banking crises. Particular monies 
became worthless. The issuing banks collapsed, often followed by other banks in 
networks of interdependent banking ties. At this stage money was clearly failing to 
fulfill two of its major functions. 
 The first institutional response to such a state of affairs was the National 
Banking Act of 1863. It dealt with the problem in two ways. First it established a 
national currency by imposing a uniform set of rules for all federally chartered banks. 
Moreover, the principle was established that all notes issued from a national federally 
chartered bank were redeemable at par with any other national banknotes and of course 
with U.S. government currency (the system was entirely fiduciary). Convertibility into 
specie for national bank notes was suspended from 1863 to 1879 as a result of the 
tremendous money creation that took place in the North to help finance the Civil War 
and Reconstruction. (The U.S. government currency was the successor of the famous 
"greenbacks" of the civil war). 
 The first measure for restricting and controlling the credit expansion 
process was taken by imposing fixed minimum reserve requirements (reserves here 
included U.S. currency plus some deposits made in other national banks, especially in 
New York). In dealing successfully with the problems, risks, and malfunctioning related 
to multiple currencies and the "wildcat bank" problem, the National Banking Act -- as 
an institutional innovation -- achieved a number of the main objectives of its designers: 
establishment of a more organized capital market and a sharp expansion of the banking 
system (by 1871, approximately 60% of all deposits were in the National Banks 
network (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963:15). The system facilitated interstate exchanges 
and the organization of stable links between local or country banks and the more 
important "city" national banks. The National Banking Act was also linked to the 
emergence at the end of the American Civil War of a potentially powerful social group: 
The East Coast financial class. One particular but crucial feature of the institutional 
structuring and regulation implied by the Act was that local or country banks, 
essentially linked to the agricultural sector, were allowed to deposit their legal reserves 
in national banks. They clearly utilized this opportunity, since city banks, especially in 
New York, were able to pay much higher interest rates on short-term deposits because 
of the demand for such deposits to finance bond market and stock market transactions. 
And this was, of course, an intent of the Act: to create a strong tendency for reserve 
centralization. The financial centers became New York, Boston, and to a lesser extent 
Philadelphia. They formed a center in relation to the periphery -- the multitude of 
smaller, less strategically located country banks. This restructuring of the financial 
market set the stage for the rapid capital mobilization and capital accumulation that took 
place during the following two decades (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963:7,35). This rapid 
economic development was accompanied by a parallel uneven development of the 
banking system. It generated new conflicts between local banks and the large, eastern 
city banks (an unintended consequence of the restructuring of the system). 
 Increases in the demand for cash balances in local banks were highly 
dependent upon the specific conditions of agricultural production and thus could occur 
at times when the demand for lendable funds was very high in cities. In such instances, 
credit stringency could reach disastrous proportions with consequent stock market 
panics. These panics contributed to overall or global instability since local banks, 
irrespective of their own demand for cash balances, began to withdraw their deposits 
from city banks at the first sign of crisis. Such a move was understandable, of course, 
since in periods of crisis, city banks usually tried to restrict the convertibility of deposits 
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into currency. The inescapable consequence was not only to create a number of bank 
defaults (a financial crisis) but also to spread the crisis to industry and commerce by 
forcing into bankruptcy enterprises unable to meet their financial obligations.23 And, 
indeed, such banking crises, which took place in 1873, 1884, 1893, 1903, and 1907, 
were accompanied by sometimes mild but nevertheless real recessions. 
 After the 1907 crisis, the most severe of all, the necessity for a major 
institutional change was widely recognized, leading to The Federal Reserve Act of 
1914. The title of the Act read as follows: An Act to provide for the establishment of 
Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting 
commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United 
States, and for other purposes." (emphasis added). This reveals in part what the 
problem was believed to be and consequently what were the objectives of the new 
institutional arrangement and regulatory process. The perceived problem concerned 
inelasticity: that is, the inability of the banking system to create additional means of 
payment when a critical shortage of liquidity threatened the effective functioning of the 
financial market and, consequently, the harmonious expansion of industrial production. 
The objective was thus to create an institution that could function as a lender of last 
resort. This was achieved in two ways: first, the creation of the Federal Reserve Note to 
replace all the old currencies in circulation and to control its issuance by a single but 
decentralized institution: The Federal Reserve System. Second, Federal Reserve Banks 
could, if needed, rediscount commercial paper and make open-market purchases of 
government securities to inject new Federal Reserve currency into the system (Flexible 
Reserve Requirements were introduced only in 1935, that is, after the Crash of 1929 and 
the Great Depression). 
 The perception of the problem and the design of the regulatory mechanism 
focused on a flexible currency supply. And it is apparent that such a "technical-neutral" 
solution was satisfactory for all the major agents involved. The ability to inject cash 
reserves when necessary and thus to prevent bank failures was satisfactory for small 
depositors and small banks concerned with the security and stability of their deposits. It 
was also satisfactory for the large financial institutions since, by allowing rediscounting, 
it preserved the stability of financial markets in the face of fluctuations in the relative 
demand for credit.24 
  While solving a number of problems, a major new risk, a potential source 
of great instability and conflict was introduced -- although not intentionally -- as time 
would show: The Act set no limit to the stock of money and thus no restriction on credit 
expansion other than the one imposed by the Federal Reserve Board through its now 
almost complete control over the stock of money.25 Also important to keep in mind is 
that the policies of the Federal Reserve System, and in particular the Federal Reserve 
Board, were quite strongly influenced by the large banking institutions of the East.26 
The System -- in the context of a dynamic, expansive, powerful capitalism and Eastern 
banking system -- tended to give priority to credit expansion.27 
 The period from 1921 through 1929 was characterized by stable but rapid 
economic growth. To quote Friedman and Schwartz (1963:240): "As the decade wore 
on, the System took -- and perhaps even more was given -- credit for the generally 
stable conditions that prevailed and high hopes were placed in the potency and 
monetary policy as then administered." The real test of the Federal Reserve System as a 
stabilizing device was still to come. It was to be, of course, the stock market crash of 
1929 and the entire period of the Great Depression up to 1936. A detailed consideration 
of this history is not essential for our purposes. But to analyze the potentially 
transformative character of the Federal Reserve arrangements, we shall consider two 
specific, but crucially important policy decisions made by the System policymakers 
during that period. In selecting these two decisions, we hope to point out a few key 
features of the Federal Reserve System: (1) it was unable to deal effectively with the 
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new emerging problems that resulted from the contradictory role of money (pointed out 
earlier); (2) it allowed the new emerging problems (and dysfunctionalities) to develop 
into a crisis; and, indeed, through its own actions it worsened the crisis. Over the long 
run, it changed the "dimensionality" of the problem, in part by changing the perceptions 
and value orientations of the actors involved (DeVille and Burns, 1976). 
 Many economists have wondered how to explain that, in the midst of the 
Great Depression, the Federal Reserve System actually raised the discount rate in 1931, 
increased the reserve requirements imposed on member banks in 1936, and generally 
throughout the period let the money stock steadily decline!28 Both measures tended to 
clearly aggravate the recession as many economists, as different as Friedman and 
Marglin, agree (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963:694, 698; Marglin, 1975:10; see also 
Gordon, 1974:72). Why was monetary policy so inept? 29   
 To understand this, let us recall that the National Banking Act of 1863 and 
the Federal Reserve Act of 1914 became the institutional cornerstones of a regulative 
process: to establish institutional controls between essentially suppliers of cash balances 
(reflected initially in the importance of local, small banks) and credit institutions. Such 
relational control (Burns et al, 1985; DeVille and Burns, 1976) tended to further 
strengthen the domination of the credit institutions such as the large eastern city banks 
over the system. This manifested itself in the steady increase in reserve centralization. It 
also explains why the Federal Reserve Act, by making the stock of money a 'regulative 
or control variable' was no longer setting any automatic self-determining limit to its 
increase and, therefore, to the expansion of credit. And this is exactly what happened 
when the stock market boom began to develop dramatically in 1927. The Federal 
Reserve Board was faced with a major dilemma or predicament: either to stop credit 
expansion and break the bull stock market but also stop economic growth, or risk the 
opposite. It did not choose definitely either of these two policies. From Spring, 1927, 
until the Crash in, October, 1929, it tried desperately to maintain a middle way which 
failed to achieve either of the two objectives. In this way, the problem developed into a 
crisis. 
 When the stock market crash occurred, the first reaction of the managers 
of the Federal System was to protect the banking system through rediscounting. But 
such expansion of Federal Reserve credit was not sufficient in the context of a massive 
crash to slow down the continuous decline in the stock of money. This led to the worst 
shortage of liquidity ever experienced. The shortage of liquidity resulted in waves of 
bank failures, which culminated in the famous "banking holiday" of 1933. The entire 
process had been exacerbated by the restrictive monetary actions taken by the Federal 
Reserve Board, as mentioned earlier. Why was such action taken? Not out of 
irrationality, or incompetence. But because the Federal Reserve managers still 
concerned themselves with the stability of the currency, and particularly its external 
stability, even in the face of a banking collapse. From the start of 1931, in the face of 
low interest rates within the U.S., a substantial amount of monetary gold flowed out of 
the country and required an increase in the discount rate to stop this flow.30 The demand 
that the value of currency be stabilized explains the Federal Reserve Board's decision to 
increase reserve requirements in 1936! Such increase was the result of the constant fear 
that any expansionary monetary policy would create inflation. The policy contributed to 
bringing about the sharp recession of 1937 and 1938. In a certain sense, the Federal 
Reserve managers produced an "amplification effect" through its own actions. 
 In sum, regulative institutional arrangements may stabilize a system and 
thus allow, at least temporarily, for its expansion. But it also increases the potential -- 
the dangers and risks of other failures (see DeVille and Burns (1976) for a discussion of 
such dangers and risks). 31 The stage is set for future major failure or collapse of the 
banking system.  
 
 
  
 23
2. Regulating and Stabilizing Money Systems as Complex, Large-scale Socio-
technical Systems 
 
Money and money systems are, in part, constructed and managed through normative as 
well as political regulation, as suggested earlier: for instance, in the case of Melanesian 
shell money systems; entrepreneurial regulation in the USA (that is, private banks 
establish and print their own money as in the early development of the American 
banking system); and public regulation in the USA through the creation and 
development of the Federal Reserve System. The reliability and stability of money and 
the monetary order are key concerns of monetary authorities, banks, and economic 
agents as well as the general public. Distrust can arise quickly and loss of confidence in 
the system spread rapidly, threatening the system as a whole. This is, in part, a case of 
self-fulfilling beliefs (where beliefs, and shifts of beliefs are part of the processes of 
change, destabilization as well as stabilization).  
 In their efforts to effectively regulate a monetary order, policymakers and 
managers develop a rough model of the system and a set of tools with which to try to 
steer and control the system. There are cognitive and epistemological problems as well 
as operative problems with such regulation. Several of the major problems, risks, and 
dangers relating to money and money systems which regulators try to identify and deal 
with through particular institutional arrangements and policies are the following:  
(1) Counterfeiting and debasing. Some economic agents may create non-legal or even 
illegal monies and make use of such monies in their transactions (in some cases, these 
may become recognized currencies and a type of "black market” arises. Even in gold 
systems, royal monarchs were not disinclined to debase the coinage in order to cover 
rising expenditures (which could not be covered by taxes or increasing taxation).  The 
extraction of additional seigniorage has not been an uncommon practice, exploited by 
kings and other makers of money, based on the difference between the value of the 
bullion used and the face value of the coin. 
 With modern forms of paper money (or legal paper), the cost or value of 
the paper is negligible, while the face or nominal value is determined by the authority. 
Hence, the authority or a network of banks can create money -- in part in response to 
demand -- in order to resolve income struggles and conflict over the distribution of 
income (including the state's problems of financing its projects, including wars, when 
the possibilities of financing through taxation are insufficient) (Baumgartner and Burns, 
1980; Baumgartner et al, 1984, 1986; Burns et al, 1987). Of course, the power of the 
authority to determine value relates to the institutional setup and regulation of the 
money-system, and the extent to which people can trust in the system. 
(2) Money assets cannot always be effectively stored; there is the risk of theft, of 
tampering with the ledgers, easy access to electronic accounts, failure of an electronic 
money system, or its computers and backup, etc. 
(3) Bank crashes or crash of the monetary system. There is a loss of confidence in 
particular banks or in the monetary system as a whole, as discussed earlier. This may or 
may not raise doubts about the currency as such. 
(4) Loss of domestic confidence in the currency and/or in the monetary authority. This 
may occur because experts make statements to this effect, and set in motion self-
fulfilling prophesies, for example "bank runs" and crashes, when people no longer trust 
in a system, either particular banks or the system as a whole (e.g., its currency) (whether 
or not their distrust is well-grounded) and where they perceive the risk of losing 
substantial sums of monetary wealth. Or it may occur through everyday experiences, 
and organic processes of communication, and diffusion of representations and 
strategies: people experience the currency as losing value. People may "vote" with their 
accounts, removing money from banks, exchanging the currency for gold, or for what 
they consider more reliable or robust currencies. 
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(5) Loss of confidence among foreign agents who consequently refuse to hold or accept 
the currency (resulting in currency depreciation or in devalution). Such loss of 
confidence may not be shared by the public, or its key economic agents, within a given 
society. But depreciation -- or even the threat of major depreciation -- may motivate 
many of them to remove deposits or savings accounts in the domestic currency in favor 
of more reliable currencies. 
 Any of a number of particular events or developments may result in 
growing distrust and actions which erode institutional definitions of reality, that is key 
"social facts" of the monetary order. For instance,32 
(i) "objective data" may indicate problems, e.g. a report on the liquidity of the bank or  
disappearance of large sums of money; or the collapse of similar banks. 
(ii)others express or exhibit distrust, e.g. withdrawing money, or exchanging the 
domestic currency for other currencies or for gold. 
(iii) changing conditions or contextual developments that some "experts" interpret as 
threatening or making for a precarious situation for banks.  
(iv) behavior of the authorities or managers which indicate serious problems or risk of 
failure. Particularly critical is a situation where strategic institutions or their 
representatives or other elites behave in a distrustful way.  
(v) generalized distrust or suspicion of institutions, in particular the banking order. 
 Thus, loss of confidence or distrust may arise in a number of ways and for 
a variety of reasons. It may be general, or it may be focused on particular components 
of the monetary order. In the latter case, it may be directed at the monetary authority's 
or government's trustworthiness. For instance, the public, or key actors in the public, 
come to doubt the moral integrity or the technical-administrative competence of the 
authority to regulate and maintain a stable, effective currency, or to regulate and 
guarantee the performance of the banks and the banking system. Or a new party or 
political leadership comes into power perceived by the business and banking 
communities as lacking a commitment and/or competence to manage the monetary 
order. Yet, another pattern is that there emerge radical changes (shocks) in the behavior 
of economic actors or in the performance of the money system, which raise doubts 
about the established authority's capability to handle the emergent problems; there is 
increased uncertainty, and a perception of new dangers and risks. Therefore, public trust 
in the monetary order declines.  
 Institutionalized definitions of reality, and the specific "social facts" 
central to a monetary order do not simply depend on rules and sanctions. They depend 
also on the definition and framing of reality. And such a definition is accomplished 
through a variety of cognitive and interactive mechanisms that operate more invisibly 
than many institutionalized social control and sanctioning mechanisms. Such a 
definition is of strategic importance, since the effective performance -- and indeed the 
right and proper functioning of the social order -- depends on participants' patterns of 
action and interaction. They orient, make judgments, and act on the basis of a particular 
definition of the situation, a particular framing that derives from their beliefs and 
judgments  -- that the monetary order and its key components -- functions as it should. 
Thus, convergence of expectations and public trust stabilize a definition of reality, 
which makes for more or less orderly or patterned behavior and which then contributes 
to maintaining or reinforcing their trust. This complex feedback – which involves a 
complex of social and cognitive mechanisms -- makes for relatively robust (but 
nevertheless vulnerable) social orders.  Spreading distrust, as we have seen, can rapidly 
undermine an order.  
   Because of this, policymakers and regulators not only orient their 
policies and measures to "hard data" such as interest rates and quantity of money, credit 
and debt expansion. But they orient them to stabilizing or reinforcing collective trust in 
the viability of money, banks, and the monetary order. Multiple institutional, regulative, 
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and image-management strategies are used to establish and maintain trust in a monetary 
order, its key agents, and the monies themselves. For example, 
(i) Professionalism. There is a stress on the professional ethics, competence, and 
standards of the institutions and, in particular, their policymakers, managers, and 
experts. The latter are supposed to know -- and to be skilled in applying or enforcing -- 
rational, institutionalized rules and principles for generating proper and effective 
performance, including ways to regulate the system. There is not only a stress on 
technical competence and skill but also on an ethics of performance. Power will not be 
abused or exploited for personal gain. It will not be carelessly applied. Professionalism 
is the watchword.33 It concerns not only technical competence but also the quality of 
honesty and moral fortitude.  
(ii) Certification. Expertise and professional knowledge and skills are certified. 
Certification concerns, of course, formal education and the receipt of degrees. But there 
is also frequent certification by authorities and regulative agencies (e.g. bank 
inspectors) of the competence and integrity of banks, managements, regulation, etc.34  
(iii) Image management. Trust in monetary systems, banks, the currency, authorities 
and money managers is generated in part through the systematic requirements and 
controls -- expectations and collective belief formation -- that they are expected to meet 
certain standards, that they are certified and can be expected to behave in role-
appropriate ways. These standards and controls are emphasized in numerous public 
discourses. Efforts are made to project images consistent with the required technical 
competence and moral qualities of the institutions and their agents. The images are 
defended against public attacks or even suggestions of incompetence, ethical ambiguity, 
or corruption. Uncertainties and ambiguities are interpreted and clarifications provided. 
Obvious deviants are condemned.35  
(iv) Regulation. There are elaborate regulative arrangements, which are emphasized and 
given publicity in image management. The authorities, the banks, and the bank 
managers operate controls -- to a certain degree ritualistically -- in order to assure the 
public that the institution, and its agents, are performing properly and effectively: That 
their capabilities are maintained, that any shortcomings or failings have been corrected 
and that future performance and functioning can be relied on. 
(v) Coercive function. A modern state often requires that accounts be domestic currency 
accounts; that economic agents accept payment of debts or purchases in the domestic 
currency, etc. A multiple of practices are generated that reinforce or help maintain a 
particular social reality -- consistent with the institutionalized definition of reality and 
strategic "social facts" of the monetary order. Of course, the state may find it difficult, 
under some conditions, to enforce this mechanism -- or to convince people to comply 
with it, as the emergence of black money markets point up.   
(vi) Depositor security net and other institutional arrangements. One example of a 
security net that contributes to stabilizing monetary orders is a central insurance agency 
for depositors, insuring their deposits against bank failure. Knowledge that the central 
bank or the government will operate as a bank of last resort and intervene to save a bank 
from a crash performs the same function.  
 In sum, a network of mechanisms and controls operate to maintain and 
stabilize public trust in the monetary order. The limitations of regulation and 
stabilization are discussed in the following section. Here, we examine particular 
institutional arrangements as mechanisms to stabilize public trust in monetary orders. 
 
3. Institutional Facilitation and Maintenance of Public Trust in a Monetary Order.  
 
As suggested above, a major systematic factor in establishing and maintaining trust in 
banks and a banking system is an institutionalized security net against bank 
malfunctioning or failure. This is accomplished through laws, policies, and other 
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institutional arrangements (prudential regulation) that serve to reinforce and stabilize 
public trust in the monetary order, in particular the liquidity of banks. They operate to 
counteract or negate destabilizing rumors or movements -- and make banks and the 
banking system less vulnerable to movements of distrust or actions such as "runs" on 
banks. Particular arrangements that stabilize the institutionalized definition of the 
situation, the realization of strategic "social facts" of the banking order, are, for 
example, the establishment of a central deposit insurance agency or a bank of last resort, 
the central bank with substantial powers. Thus, deliberate institutional mechanisms and 
controls offset or regulate self-fulfilling prophecies through which distrust or fears are 
translated into reality (Merton, 1957:490). Examples of such measures for stabilizing 
monetary and banking systems are: 
(i) Banks only loan out money with shorter repayment periods than the periods which 
depositors have bound themselves to leave their money in the bank (it is essential that 
the deposit periods be legally binding or constrained by effective penalties).  
(ii) Banks loan out money only to borrowers who provide readily liquefiable collateral. 
Moreover, the procedures for banks to claim that borrowers have defaulted and to take 
over the collateral are made sufficiently short to meet likely incoming claims of 
depositors. More broadly the criteria used to determine whether a loan application is 
accepted might de-emphasize the collateral or security and stress instead the borrower's 
potential to generate enough income (whether generated from the acquisition financed 
from the loan itself or from other sources) to service (pay interest and repay principal) 
the loan. Tightening of such criteria may be prompted by the threat (or the actuality) of 
a financial crisis. 
(iii) A bank of last resort, e.g. the central bank or a central deposit insurance agency, is 
available to guarantee deposits in all banks up to a certain amount.36 As Saunders 
(1994:303) stresses, "Regulators have long recognized the inherent instability of the 
banking system due to the all or nothing payoff features of the deposit contract. As a 
result, regulatory mechanisms are utilized to ease the liquidity problems of banks and to 
deter bank runs and panics. The two major liquidity risk insulation devices are deposit 
insurance and the discount window. In the case of the USA, deposit insurance has 
effectively deterred bank panics since 1933." 
 Institutional arrangements and banking policies, such as (i) and (iii) which 
are widely practiced today, provide better grounding -- more institutional support -- for 
the belief and trust in the liquidity of banks. Therefore, a rumor -- and spreading belief 
-- in a bank's inability to meet the claims of depositors would be much more likely to be 
falsified in contemporary institutional reality than under the conditions prevailing in 
Merton's original case. In this sense, the shared belief corresponds to -- or has validity 
with respect to -- socially constructed and maintained conditions in a particular 
historical, institutional context.   
 
4. Bounded Rationality and Bounded Control: Limits of Regulating and Monetary 
Orders 
 
People have varying degrees of trust—which is typically high in most OECD countries 
-- in large-scale, complex, technocratic systems such as nuclear power plants, air traffic 
control systems, railway systems, highways (with bridges and tunnels, etc), medical 
systems, the monetary order, etc.). Nevertheless, these complex, socio-technical 
systems are vulnerable to accidents and major material and social losses. The discussion 
here suggests, among other things, the complex interweaving of economic, political, and 
socio-cultural processes and conditions, the limits, vulnerabilities, risk zones of a socio-
technical system such as a monetary order -- in terms of how it is put together, managed 
and operated, and sustained.  
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• Modern money-systems are administered on the basis of an incomplete model or 
knowledge of the system. The system is all-too-complex; it is also undergoing 
frequent, in some instances substantial, change. 
• The policymakers and managers -- even with adequate knowledge levels -- lack 
complete operative control, in part because complex, unintended and 
unanticipated interactions take place without their knowledge; but even with 
knowledge, they have limited means to intervene properly and effectively.  
• Agents participating in the system learn, develop new perceptions, new 
strategies, which impact on and change the system (that is, through organic 
processes). 
• The policymakers and regulators may abuse their authority and trust in order to 
solve other problems such as societal conflicts, e.g. by printing banknotes to 
finance massive government projects including wars, generating inflationary 
pressures and growing loss of confidence in and distrust of the money and 
monetary order. 
• There is a general risk of instability and disorder. Loss of trust in the system 
leads to flight from the currency and "runs" on banks. When a binding definition 
of the situation no longer applies, there is a threat of a crash. Often distrust and 
loss of confidence start locally, or in particular networks and spread (as with the 
diffusion of a belief or technology). And a self-fulfilling process based on 
spreading counter-beliefs emerges and grows in significance. 
 
In general, knowledge of complex socio-technical systems is typically bounded and the 
human capacity to control such systems imperfect.  First, there is the simple and well-
understood problem that actors learn and experiment and develop or create new 
strategies and ways of manipulating the world, that is exhibit human agency. This often 
produces results that cannot be understood very well in advance because they are quite 
literally beyond the experiential and knowledge bases of existing models and their 
creators. 37  
 A regulative model is never complete, and institutional regulative 
measures or devices are never fail-safe. New problems arise for which there is no 
language, conceptions, etc. to describe and analyze them. It follows that policy makers 
and managers of the system must constantly update their model(s) of the system, how it 
works, what can go wrong, what dangers and risks there are, and what measures can be 
used to deal with various types of key or strategic problems. Sooner or later, however, 
failure occurs (as in the case of the regulation and management of other large-scale, 
complex socio-technical systems). And this makes for challenges to create or develop a 
new model (possibly, even a new framework) and new control mechanisms are tried, 
discarded, revised, developed. This sets in motion the evolution of the model as well as 
regulative measures (DeVille and Burns, 1976; Burns and Dietz, 1992b). One learns, 
acquires knowledge-by-doing, through a type of intelligent trial and error.  
 The transformations of interaction conditions confront those involved with 
new experiences and anomalies for which established models tend to provide ineffective 
or invalid interpretations and guidelines. The problem is common to all complex, 
dynamic socio-technical systems, particularly when conditions change, and 
participating agents innovate, by introducing new technologies and developing new 
strategies: namely, established regulative models and measures come more and more to 
mismatch with the emerging conditions and increase the risks of mis-regulation and 
performance failures (Burns and Dietz, 1992b).38 
 One of the ways such mismatches arise is through a regulative dialectic 
(Kane, 1981). For instance, initial regulation is followed by a search for and 
exploitation of loopholes on the part of those affected or other agents. This results in 
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further regulatory adjustment, the discovery of new loopholes, and so on. The 
characteristic feature of the regulative dialectic, as discussed in the economics literature, 
is evasion. For example, bank holding companies in the USA have been subject to 
federal restrictions concerning geographical spread and product (service) 
diversification. Bank lawyers then developed a strategy to charter banks according to 
state (rather than federal) law. But the banks had to be constructed in such a way that 
they failed to satisfy the federal legal definition of a bank. This could be done by having 
such banks not engage in one or more proper banking activities, e.g. commercial 
lending, that are required in the federal definition of a genuine bank. In this way, a 
quasi-bank could escape federal jurisdiction. This loophole was eventually closed by 
redefining "bank" in the law. It came to be defined as any institution which obtains 
federal deposit insurance, which is essential to banks operating in the USA. In this way, 
the episode of the "non-bank banks"  was brought to an end, ending a particular 
regulative dialectic. 
 Another example is the catastrophic consequences of the de-regulation of 
the savings and loan institutions in the USA in the 1980s. The motivation of this policy 
-- and underlying legislation -- was to reduce the differences and increase competition 
between the commercial banks and other financial institutions, and, in particular, to 
redress the disadvantages faced by savings and loan associations. However, a 
substantial number of savings and loan associations discovered -- and took advantage of 
-- much increased lending powers and took on significantly greater risk, even though 
their experience in making various new kinds of loans was very limited and technically 
inadequate. Also, there were increased opportunities for purely criminal or near-
criminal intentions. This set the stage for the massive failure of many savings and loans 
associations -- and the need for a subsequent bailout by the U.S. government (motivated 
by economic as well as political considerations, since many ordinary, middle-class 
people had their life savings on deposit in these associations). 
 Over time the regulators accumulate, of course, practical (and scientific) 
knowledge of the systems, their agents and interactions, which they are to regulate. 
However, there will always be limits to this knowledge, above all in connections with 
innovations and entrepreneurship among actors participating in and affecting the 
performance and development of the money system.39  
 In general, new technologies, new agents or conditions of social action 
and interaction -- e.g., a powerful social agent or movement emerging with an 
alternative conception of appropriate social reality or exploiting opportunities provided 
by new technologies -- set the stage for patterning social activities and experiences 
which are likely to invalidate conventional beliefs, models and statements about social 
reality. Prior to the emergence and actions of the new agent(s), established beliefs and 
practices corresponded to the action conditions and enjoyed a relatively high probability 
of validation. But in the context of emerging, transforming circumstances, ruling truths 
fail, and the stage is set for new formulations about social reality, that is new ruling 
truths appropriate for the emerging order (with its particular selective environment). 
  
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
Several of the main points made in this paper are: 
(1) A monetary system is a specific social order created and maintained through 
institutional arrangements, technological devices, and human agency. The effective 
functioning of a monetary system also contributes to maintaining and reproducing other 
institutions and institutional arrangements, e.g. property rights (Admassie and Burns, 
1996), large-scale markets, networks of enterprises, trade and industry, taxation 
systems, government, etc. 
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(2) The institutional alchemy of modern fiat money involves the transformation of 
essentially worthless pieces of paper or symbols in a ledger into money. This requires 
that money systems be constituted and regulated in systematic ways. A number of 
security problems are addressed through a network of laws, prudential regulations, and 
controls that are instituted in order to avoid or minimize risks and to maintain security. 
The maintenance of collective belief and trust are key conditions for stable, robust 
money systems, since there can be no stable, predictable monetary order -- and other 
orders such as property rights and budgetary systems -- if strategic actors and 
substantial parts of a modern society distrust and lose faith in the money or the money 
system.  
 When there is trust in the system and general confidence in its money -- a 
dynamic social equilibrium obtains. A network of processes -- formal/"legislative" as 
well as organic/"spontaneous" -- operate to establish and maintain the monetary order in 
such an equilibrium. Under some conditions, destabilization may occur and confidence 
in the money, its face value, or in the system as a whole is eroded or collapses. In light 
of money systems viewed in an historical perspective, the establishment and 
maintenance of public trust in a money and money system on the part of money-holders 
and users is essential. Because of the vulnerability of monetary order to movements of 
distrust and potential instability -- with dangers and risks of substantial economic losses 
and social and political instability -- heavy doses of institutionalized regulation and 
management are often established, and required. 
(3). Modern money systems are then not simply spontaneous orders. They entail the 
organized social construction and regulation of money and money processes. The paper 
has focused on the institutionalized processes whereby social definitions of reality, of 
social and institutional facts, in this case "fiat money" are made to stick. 
(4) The social construction of modern money combines in complex ways a purposive, 
legislative-type process with an organic, diffused process: (i) The process is legislative 
in the sense that an authority -- the state or a central bank -- defines a paper or other 
material as a unit of money and formulates policies and administers the money system. 
(ii) It is organic in the sense that money is "validated in use or in practice" through the 
multiple transactions of large populations that contribute to defining reality and are to a 
large extent outside the control of the monetary authority. Thus, it is not simply enough 
for an authority, for example the state or powerful economic interests such as the 
commercial banks, to designate that certain paper is money having more or less a 
particular value. To make this determination binding requires a whole set of social 
construction and control mechanisms. But social practices and interactions operate to 
validate the definition and to make the definition binding. Money and money systems 
become social facts -- and social structures -- more or less enduring and predictable. 
They are also beyond the control of non-government agents, although powerful private 
(as well as government agents) may strongly influence the process. 
(5) Money, as a technology, can be considered in the same way as any artifact or tool 
which enables human agents to act and interact more effectively, to solve certain 
problems, to make individual and collective gains that otherwise would not be possible, 
or would be much more costly. For instance, money, overcomes some of the problems 
of barter, allowing for a multitude of indirect relationships and a highly developed 
division of labor at the same time that it plays a key integrative function in modern 
differentiated society (see later). Moreover, the money technology serves as a 
generalized means of defining, standardizing, and systematizing a certain type of value, 
"exchange" or "market-value".   
(6) Universalizing Characteristics of Money; Universal Particularizing and Indexing 
Processes. Money is constructed and developed as a universalizing symbol system, a 
symbol system often operating in a highly decontextualized manner. Among other 
things, it translates particular (or local) substantive values into universal values. The 
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universalizing features of money are, however, often exaggerated, as Zelizer (1994) 
rightfully emphasizes. Money introduced and flowing in particular social and 
institutional contexts is used -- through social indexing or earmarking processes -- for 
substantive- or use-values, specific programs and projects. This e particularization of 
the use of money is especially visible in organizations in their budget processes and in 
accounting systems (Baumgartner and Burns, 1982). Particularizing processes entail 
then the use of generalized money purchasing power-- with its universal exchange-
value -- into substantive- or use-values: first, as indexed or earmarked accounts or 
budgets -- that are associated with or linked to particular plans, projects, programs -- 
and then into concrete realizations of plans, projects, and programs, by utilizing the 
corresponding accounts or budgets. In turn, some of the projects and activities may 
result in the acquisition of money assets: either through market or through 
administrative/budgetary processes. Thus, commodities, plans, projects, or particular 
objects, which have potential use-values for actors, attract or draw on pools of 
generalized exchange-money assets.   
(7)  Value transformation processes -- through social institutions and interaction 
processes -- have been of central interest in this work, for instance the transformation of 
exchange-value and substantive-values into one another; or, the transformation of 
market exchange-value into substantive-values in given institutional contexts. A key 
point in our analysis of money is that money flows and processes entail both 
universalizing and particularizing mechanisms in the exchange processes. Clearly, 
money is understood and functions in many contexts in a universalistic -- highly 
decontextualized manner; but it is also universally subject to re-contextualization, to 
particularization in its uses, symbolic interpretations and meanings. In other words, 
particularization and a network of control and regulative processes operate at the same 
time, in competition with or in opposition to universalization processes. In many cases, 
the latter must be constrained and regulated if particular social arrangements and 
boundaries are to be sustained. In general, there are normative as well as micro- and 
macro-political aspects to money use and money flows. 
(8) Modern monetary order(s) are large-scale, complex socio-technical systems, calling 
for sophisticated, rational. and dynamic regulation. A regulative regime entails a certain 
minimum level of social or collective discipline over the money creation and regulation 
processes. For example, the government or agency exercising this power must exercise 
restraint in not exploiting (at least excessively) the powers of money creation, by 
printing money in order to finance government deficits resulting from major projects, 
welfare programs with institutionalized entitlements, resolution of conflicting income 
demands among major societal groups, war, etc The result of abuse of the money 
creating power is powerful inflationary pressures and destabilization of the monetary 
order (Baumgartner and Burns, 1980, 1984; Baumgartner et al, 1981,1986). 
 Effective management and operation of a system entailing dangers and 
risks requires a model of the money system and its mechanisms. It also requires 
institutional arrangements and strategies to identify types of dangerous problems and to 
carry out measures to deal with them, in short to minimize risks and to enhance the 
security or the sense of security. This is accomplished to a certain extent through 
effective image-management and the type of self-fulfilling beliefs and prophesies. 
(section III). A major problem historically with monetary orders -- instability and the 
threat of collapse -- is that new complex, large-scale systems emerge, but the regulative 
means are often inadequate or unreliable. There may be no powerful or authoritative 
agent responsible for the system and capable of effectively regulating it. They may lack 
sufficient knowledge about how the system functions or the particular dangers and risks 
involved or, even with such knowledge, they may not know -- or lack the skills to 
utilize -- the best institutional arrangements and regulative measures for effective 
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regulation of a monetary system. These limitations are not publicly stressed, nor is the 
historical pattern of banking crises and monetary system failures.  
(9). Money serves a number of purposes that are typically contradictory. There is 
continuous dialectics around money creation and money use. One of the major sources 
of instability and risk with money and money systems -- and a challenge to money 
system managers -- is precisely the multiple purposes to which money is put and the 
different meanings associated with it: medium of exchange, storage of value, an 
empowering factor in economic expansion, an asset providing opportunity for 
speculation, for supplying means of capital, etc. Contradictions between purposes and 
goals (e.g. stable money value versus adequate growth in credit or money for the 
purpose of economic development; or stability of the exchange rate for keeping 
inflation under control as opposed to allowing-for-devaluation to stimulate exports and 
economic growth) evoke predicaments, equivocation, and sometimes inconsistent, 
irregular decision-making. Historically, as suggested in section IV, this has led at times 
to "irrational" management of money systems, and to their ultimate failure or 
breakdown. Actions taken to deal with particular dangers may even result in 
amplification of the problems, rather than resolution of them and stabilization of the 
monetary order. Part of the problem, as we show, is not only a lack of regulative 
measures or tools but also the lack of adequate conceptualization of money and models 
of money systems. Our perspective has, therefore, practical epistemological and 
methodological implication s. The models of any complex, dynamic system are always 
incomplete and tend, in addition, to become increasingly misleading and possibly 
altogether obsolete over time. Institutional arrangements and regulative measures also 
tend to prove inadequate. Part of the problem is that in any socio-technical system, 
human actors exercise their agency developing new conceptions and strategies which 
alter the system, making it a different system than the one represented in an initial 
model This leads inevitably to a gap between the model and the emerging interaction 
patterns and their consequences. Regulative measures executed within the perspective 
of the model fail to function as they did in the past because of the changes in actors’ 
perceptions, their interactions, and system flows and developments. 
(10) Societal differentiation -- in our dynamic institutional perspective -- results in the 
expansion of the number of distinct domains characterized by different institutionalized 
substantive or use-values and constituted and regulated by particular rule systems and 
money indexation processes. Zelizer (1994:142) suggests such a development, "As the 
world becomes more complex, some things do of course standardize and globalize, but 
as long-distance connections proliferate, for individuals everywhere life and its choices 
become more, rather than less, intricate..... That is why we can expect new forms of 
earmarking to multiply with social change. To the extent that money does become more 
prominent in social life, people will segregate, differentiate, label, decorate, and 
particularize it to meet their complex social needs." In a word, social differentiation 
entails an expansion and elaboration of institutionalized values, and of value 
transformations between institutional domains. Actors in different domains give 
different meanings to money use as well as to their activities. Social life is increasingly 
fragmented.40  
 Ironically, while the money-nexus is a key factor in societal differentiation 
-- and contributes to disruption and disorder of core value processes -- it enables 
solutions or partial solutions to many of the integration problems (and, therefore, 
provides an empowering capacity for social problem-solving). That is, a major 
integrating mechanism in modern society are precisely the money mediated 
transactions: Money as a universalizing medium of exchange allows for a nexus of 
exchanges, transfers, distributions and redistribution of exchange-value not only among 
particular agents or groups of agents, but among the many different social domains and 
sectors of a modern, differentiated society. In this sense, money functions in the way 
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that most economists conceptualize it. In sum, money mediated relations and processes 
while contributing to the division of society also integrate it (cf. Dodd, 1994)   
   
 
 
  
  ENDNOTES 
1. Precious metals have enjoyed widespread use as money, owing not only to their intrinsic value but to 
material features such as convenience of handling, durability, and divisibility. 
2. Units or standards of account (such as those used within an administrative system or the earlier ECU of 
the European Union) need not function as a generalized means of exchange; rather they are for 
accounting purposes. Such accounts may, however, imply or be translated into actual sums of money. 
3 Economists distinguish between "fiduciary" money , issued by some public authority or publicly 
mandated autonomous body and "scriptural" money issued by the private banking systems and based on 
its assets. Our point is that both are ultimately based on trust and implicit social contracts. 
4 On Aglietta and Orlean, see the interesting review by Grahl (1999). 
5One of us (Burns) wants to stress that people, in using money in particular institutional domains such as 
family, local community, educational and research settings, government, business enterprises, etc, operate 
with institutionalized classification systems making meaningful distinctions and earmarking money for 
meaningful purposes in each domain (Zelizer, 1994). Such institutionalized mechanisms -- for each 
domain -- regulate generalized legal tender and transform it into particular monies and institutionalized 
values. An amount of money -- possessing an exchange value -- is transformed into potential [or actual] 
concrete projects, activities, and interaction orders embodying or realizing substantive- or use-values. 
Thus, a family may have categories such as "petty cash", "children's allowances", "summer vacation 
money", "family savings", "retirement or pension fund" (these may be made more or less inaccessible 
through various devices, such as designated accounts with banks, insurance companies etc.). (Zelizer, 
1994). Thus, the money symbols are complemented with other symbols and meanings. 
 The designated or earmarked monies have particular meanings and are to be used in particular 
ways in a group or organization and, therefore, loose some of their universalistic potentialities (at least 
within the given institutional and normative constraints). Money regulation reflects the symbolic and 
practical consequences of a given social order (Zelizer,1994; Burns et al, 1972). Universalistic money is 
particularized within a given institutional domain, and actors try to determine and regulate the use of 
money according to the social order with its categories, beliefs, norms, values, and the symbolic 
meanings of actions (such as the particular appropriate or legitimate uses of money in that context). At 
the same time, there are universalizing pressures, in some cases with agents seeking to exploit the 
universalizing features of money-value and to break through and erode the constraints and normative 
order essential to particularization (see below on  the politics of these processes). In other words, 
particularization and a network of control and regulative processes operate at the same time, in 
competition with or in opposition to universalization processes. In many cases, the latter must be 
constrained and regulated if particular social arrangements and boundaries are to be maintained and 
reproduced.  
  
6. The differentiation into various spheres of influence also played a role in internal limitations on the 
accumulation of power and the domination of big men. A big man's followers often have had other 
alternatives available, in the form of other big men they could follow. Also, in some cases, when the big 
man overstepped himself, a number of his supporters banded together to establish a countervailing power. 
In the end this group might kill the big man (Pospisil, 1963).  
7 One of the authors (Burns) emphasizes the societal importance of processes of commodification and de-
commodification. There are many obvious parallels in the modern world to the constraints on the 
exchange of money for tabu. Laws and norms restrict the use of money in transactions that violate 
important community values and norms (Burns and Flam, 1987; Burns, 1995). It is not only illegal but 
considered morally wrong to commodify government policies or court decisions. Of course, ”markets”  
for political services can and do arise; there are also circuitous ways that such "exchanges" can be 
arranged. In modern societies, many potential (or historically available) "commodities" are outlawed or 
considered anathema. In a certain sense, there is a de-commodification -- the imposition of restrictions on 
those entities for which money can be exchanged. There are typically, for example, restrictions on the 
acquisition and sale of human beings (that is, slavery or trading in infants), body parts, sexual services, 
child labor, etc. Human sperm and artificial insemination are decommodified in Sweden (at the same time 
that "sperm markets" have been successfully established in several states in the USA) (Burns and Flam, 
1987). Of course, powerful special interests may underlie to a greater or lesser extent such restrictions, 
but the moral component -- and moral discourses referring to it -- are of great significance in the 
regulation, and particularization, of money exchange in modern society. 
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8.We are developing a general theory of value and value transformation, showing the role of institutions, 
rituals, and discourses in particular transformations. This concerns not only the production and use of 
valuables, but also ways in which value is enhanced, or depreciated (desecrated, contaminated, etc.). 
9. A business enterprise is expected to be rationally oriented to profit. If profits fall below the value that 
bank interest brings, then the investors or top management may consider transferring the capital to a 
bank. However, many enterprises involve projects, activities, etc. which key groups in the organization, 
including management, identify with and derive meaning from, etc. Therefore, they do not behave in a 
perfectly "rational-economic way". Similarly, managers or key agents may assume a religious or other 
educational role, or aim to create a community with strong loyalties etc. While this may, in part, be 
motivated in economic terms, it is impossible to make precise calculations about gains, etc. Faith or belief 
plays then an essential role -- but some of this may not be motivated on economic grounds, but on 
grounds of transcendental values. Of course, how far this may go will depend on the type of economic 
environment in which the enterprise or its management find themselves (Burns and Dietz, 1992a). 
 
10. Karl Marx explored ideas along these lines. But he -- and many following him -- lacked the 
institutional and cultural theories to describe and analyze value nexuses and value transformations. 
11 Value transformations are a sociological universal. One of the authors (Burns) wishes to stress that 
key value transformation(s) in any institutional domain are typically oriented to maintaining and 
reproducing the core values of the institution through investments of human efforts and money assets. 
These transformations are to a great extent institutionalized in particular activities, projects, and social 
relationships. Thus, the family uses money to provide, among other things, for ceremonies of solidarity, 
unity, and intimacy in order to produce or maintain key family symbols, including the "sense of home", 
the collective experience of fairness and justice, the dramaturgy of solidarity, etc. A religious community 
or organization transforms money into acts, programs, projects -- as they see it -- serving God, salvation, 
the complex of substantive-values that they represent or wish to represent. Some of these activities may 
entail religious education of children, missionary work in other countries or regions, providing charity to 
the poor, etc. In all of these cases, money assets are a means -- and often a highly particularized means. 
Capitalist enterprises ideally pursue the growth of money value for its own sake, formulating plans, 
projects, and programs with this in mind. The "meaning of money" in this case is precisely its general 
exchange-value, its empowering capacity and, in particular, its role in capital investment and 
accumulation of capital. This can take extreme, hegemonic forms when all other values are subordinated 
or sacrificed to such money-value pursuits. The activities of a business enterprise activities are in the 
purest case only a means to an end. In practice, of course, those involved -- including even enterprise 
owners and top managers -- may assign other non-monetary meanings to their activities and concern 
themselves with intrinsic aspects of enterprise activities, projects, and programs. At the same time, many 
of those involved in the enterprise may have little or no conception or insight into the money value nexus 
and value-transformations organized within the enterprise.  
 
12. The distinction between designed, formally organized (and often hierarchical) institutions and 
informal, organic, and spontaneous or emergent (and frequently non-hierarchical) forms has a long 
history in the social sciences. It pits Hobbes and the concept of deliberative, legislative action against 
Hume and Adam Smith (and the notion of the aggregation of local activities). In the first case, a 
deliberative, authoritative collective decision is made to form explicit rules and policies. The second form 
is populational, informal, and network-like, consisting of a multitude of small acts, decisions, and events 
that, in the aggregate, generate patterns, and even bring about changes -- but where no one deliberately or 
intentionally brings about the changes on the aggregate or macro-level. Hayek, among others, contrasts 
the planned/designed/organized institutions as opposed to the spontaneous, emergent ones..  
 In everyday language, these types of structuring processes are the top-down and the bottom-up 
processes (Burns, 1995, footnote 17). In the first case, social agents, including the state, deliberately and 
explicitly establish an institutional order, for example, a monetary order or a particular market rule 
regime regulating market access, products and transactions. In some instances, rules are designed to 
protect the interests of particular economic agents, money holders, creditors, debtors, buyers and/or 
sellers and possibly third parties. Of course, the rules may actually reflect special interests or a dominant 
coalition trying to adance their particular interests by limiting (or expanding participation and/or levels of 
transaction). (It is of course often difficult to disentangle public and private interests in the formation of 
market rules and procedures). This is a designed or "legislated" social order. 
 In organic processes structuring relationships and patterns of interaction, norms and procedures 
as well as strategies emerge out of actors' discovering or learning and developing locally certain 
strategies and procedures. That is, ordered patterns result from the aggregate effects of local strategic 
actions. Actors come to adopt and share certain norms and understandings through their interactions. This 
is an organic social order. 
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 In organizational theory (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Perrow, 1986) one finds also the distinction 
between mechanical versus organic forms of organizing and managing. While there is considerable 
ideological overtones with these distinctions, there are also serious attempts to understand and explain the 
conditions under which one form or the other emerges, is maintained and reproduced. 
 Some combination of the two processes, that is a dialectical interplay between formally designed 
and organized and informal, organic processes is a characteristic feature of the structuring and 
restructuring of money systems as well as markets (and other institutions as well).  
13.The value of a given amount of a currency may rise or decline relative to another currency or to a 
package of commodities (defining or providing a standard of consumption value, that is, money 
appreciation or depreciation (inflation). This market value is typically defined relative to a selected set of 
goods and services so as to ascertain "price stability" (for analyses of inflation and inflationary 
mechanisms from a socio-economic perspective, see Baumgartner and Burns, 1980, 1984; Baumgartner 
et al, 1981,1986; Burns et al, 1987).  
 The relative value of money -- its explicit purchasing power (e.g., with respect to the package of 
commodities referred to above) -- can be analytically distinguished from its empowering capacity. The 
later refers not so much to its "exchange value" but to the scope of its applicability. Scope refers to the 
extent of its capacity to be used in exchange for other objects, to initiate projects, programs, etc. in a 
complex, differentiated society. Wide scope implies a great power of money in society. A limited scope -- 
and therefore limited empowering capacity -- means that the money can be exchanged in the society only 
for a relatively narrow range of things, and therefore, under its control provides more limited societal 
power. The constraints on scope may be the result of normative controls discussed earlier or 
technical/structural constraints. In the latter case, for instance, most exchanges in society might take place 
through barter and administrative mechanisms rather than through money-mediated processes. 
14. The aim of the construction of models of different market systems -- in this case, money markets -- is 
to develop an empirically (including historically) oriented theory of markets, for instance by showing in 
precise ways the impact that belief and value systems and institutional arrangements have on supply, 
demand, price levels, price dispersion, volume of trade, and development of the market over time  (Burns, 
1995) (a type of computational economics (Leijonhufvud, 1993)) 
15. There is a scale of involvement or dependence of the system on the orientations, beliefs, and 
judgments of large numbers of actors. In the money system, the users, holders, exchangers of money are 
essential to the functioning -- the ongoing performance of the system, as discussed above in the case of 
self-fulfilling prophesies. The development or spread of distrust toward the money order, its agents, or 
the money itself -- that is, doubt or disbelief in their proper and effective functioning, for whatever 
reasons this arises -- tends to undermine the functioning of the system, and increase the likelihood of a 
general collapse or crisis. Actors desert the system if they believe it necessary to protect their resources or 
interests. This is the start of a "monetary crisis". 
 
16. For example, one may trust a banking system, e.g that in the USA today. This generalizes to 
particular banks, in which one would be prepared to place trust or have confidence. Still, actual 
performance of a particular bank -- one's actual experience with it or a negative assessment by banking 
experts -- might decrease public trust in that particular bank. On the other hand, the replacement of the 
old management with a new one endorsed by the banking community would probably raise the status of -
- and trust in -- the bank. Yet, a major world banking crisis -- or a major political crisis in the USA 
bringing to power major critics of the banking system prepared to change it -- would probably increase 
doubts and distrust about the future performance of USA banking as well as about particular banks. 
Again, there is no single, once and for all fixed or stabilized "trust". There is a dynamic field, with crests 
and troughs.   
 
17. In a complex differentiated society, most people have little or no knowledge or information about 
most institutions, agents, technologies, and processes. Moreover, their capabilities to obtain such 
knowledge or information are very bounded. Hence, the key role of public trust in the functioning of 
paricular institutions and agents as well as functioning of the system as a whole. This in part explains 
why trust has developed into a major concept in sociological theory (Giddens,1990; Luhmann,1979). 
 
18. In Merton's view, the belief that the bank could not meet its obligations was false in that the banks 
were in a reasonably liquid state. However, as a definition of the situation, it became true. In such terms, 
he evokes the 'Thomas Theorem' that, if human actors define a situation as true, it becomes true in its 
consequences. 
19. A bank run is technically defined as a sudden and unexpected increase in deposit withdrawals from a 
bank; such sudden surges in net deposit withdrawals risks forcing a bank into insolvency (Saunders, p. 
302). Such panics also causes a flight to safe assets such as government bills and real estate or gold. 
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20. Any bank in the USA at that time could operate in the way Merton describes, in part because of a 
shared belief in bank liquidity among its depositors. Thus, it could loan out more than the money 
deposited (since some proportion of the loans remains deposited with the bank, or returned to the bank 
through transactions. Furthermore, depositors do not normally claim their deposits at the same time). 
Besides the stability of the bank's "core" deposits, there is also the access to so called purchased funds (or 
bought funds), as a major modern day source of liquidity. Here rather than passively await the arrival of 
additional deposit funds, the financial institution actively solicits and raises additional funds on the open 
markets. 
21. Economic or political developments often play a key role in generating uncertainty and eroding the 
shared belief in a money order. This provides the fuel for risk judgments. 
 
22. But also, new cognitive frameworks and models are essential to the emergence of new institutional 
arrangements. 
23. It is interesting to note, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963:164) that banks in 1907 were much more 
vulnerable than at any earlier time because of the steady expansion of credit. The ratio of deposits to 
currency had tripled between 1879 and 1907. 
24. The new system had particular implications for center/periphery relations. It further strengthened the 
power of the large eastern city banks (more concerned with providing the adequate expansion of credit 
required by the process of capital development and capital accumulation) in relation to the small local and 
country banks (more concerned with the stability of the medium of exchange). 
25. Aside from an upper-bound for this stock of money which was imposed by the gold exchange 
standard, this was largely ineffective (see Friedman and Schwartz, 1963:192) 
26. An indication of this is that, among the several Federal Reserve Banks created by the Act, the New 
York Bank was dominant in policymaking, later on supplanted by the Board located in Washington. 
 
27. Friedman and Schwartz (1963:192) quote the testimony of Laughlin (Federal Reserve Board) in 
Congress, indicating the priority of credit expansion over maintaining a stable medium of exchange: "..it 
is primarily a question of the organization of credit rather than a question of creating essentially a 
medium of exchange... the organization of credit by discounting institutions must be the core of the 
reform and the elasticity of currency would follow it." 
28. Between August, 1929 and March, 1933, the money supply decreased by approximately 30% See 
Gordon (1974:53).  
29. Some, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963:411, 691,692), have argued that such failure was the result of 
mismanagement and incompetence of individuals. This individual or psychological explanation is 
consistent with the view of regulatory processes as purely technical-neutral devices.  
30. The failure of this policy finally compelled the Federal Reserve to suspend gold payments in 1933. 
31. The failure of the Federal Reserve system to prevent the collapse of the banking system and, 
moreover, to aggravate the depression led to substantial changes in ideas, values and beliefs. There was a 
search for new regulatory arrangements  better equipped, within the context of a capitalist system 
(DeVille and Burns, 1976).  
32. The examples focus on agents who have options. They can act on the basis of their distrust -- fleeing 
from what they believe to be a doomed or sinking ship. Some have few or no options, or an alternative 
entails excessive costs, as they see it. 
 
33. Professions, for example, medical personnel are expected to satisfy moral as well as technical 
standards. This is the basis of trust in them, and the legitimacy of their authority. 
34. Chiropractors are less institutionalized, less clearly certified than physicians. Medical schools, the 
medical profession exercises control and is able to maintain a higher level of public trust in themselves 
than chiropractors are able to do. 
35. Often, a profession, agency or organization is faced with a dilemma in dealing with failure or 
significant mistakes. The question is whether to defend the wrong-doer, maintaining a pure or clean 
professional image, one of reliability, fail-safe, etc. Such image management plays a key role in the 
stabilization of identities and images (even for the agents, individuals or collectives 
themselves)(Machado,2000). But there is a risk with such a strategy. If a case comes to public attention, 
there is an unmasking, possibly a major "scandal" and accusations of "cover-up" and corruption. This sets 
in motion even more profound questioning -- and potential distrust -- of the profession's, agency's, or 
organization's capability to regulate itself -- or to be regulated -- and to live up to high standards of 
performance and security. 
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36. Moreover, the central bank may be able and prepared to provide additional liquidity in case of serious 
threat of a run on the bank. But even this is no absolute guarantee. The entire system may be eroded and 
collapse. DeVille and Burns (1976) show that a state may establish a large-scale system that is more 
stable than the partial systems, but large scale and potentially more dangerous risks are engendered in the 
new systems. Indeed, that is the situation with international money systems today. On the one hand, there 
is high and rapidly growing interdependence ("tight coupling"), but, on the other hand, limited capacity to 
regulate this international order. 
37. The increasing scale and close interdependencies of modern banking systems makes them difficult to 
understand and control (this is a characteristic feature of large-scale, complicated socio-technical systems 
as noted by Perrow (1984) and Burns and Dietz (1992b).     
38. In contrast, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) viewed the Great Depression as caused by the 
incompetence of central bank authority. Their point of departure was the concept of a potential, rational 
agent who goes astray.  
39. Actual experience with the performance of the system -- "learning by doing" -- provides a quasi-
experiment, but as with all quasi-experiments the lack of adequate control and isolation coupled with the 
complexity of the system makes the results difficult to interpret. Competing explanations cannot be 
dismissed. This is one limit to the improvements that can be made in the models of such complex systems. 
40. Increased differentiation, development of economy-and-society stimulates the development of 
varieties of money. That is, there is a diversification of monetary instruments and credit facilities in order 
to meet different requirements or to deal with emerging problems and exploit opportunities.  Historically, 
a great varieties of monetary signs have emerged: bank notes, promises, letters of credit, bills of 
exchange, promisary notes, cheques, and short-term obligations, etc. In practice on the operative, there 
are numerous types of monies and quasi-monies created in response to demands, obvious needs, and 
opportunities.  
 Moreover, for regulative purposes, a variety of categories and types of money, defined in part 
for regulative purposes, for instance, M1, M2, M3,....,etc. For example, M1 refers to the sum of all 
currency and demand deposits held by consumers and businesses; M2 is M1 plus all savings accounts and 
time deposits as well as limited money market accounts; M3 is M2 plus money market funds held by 
financial institutions and large denominational time deposits held by financial institutions and 
corporations. 
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